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SOME ASPECTS OF THE MUTUAL FUND
AND
INVESTOR PROTECTION
SOLOMON SPIRO*

INTRODUCTION:
THE MUTUAL FUND AND THE SMALL INVESTOR
Canada is a country of limitless horizons in economic development and
growth. Canada today, with its vast natural resources, and increasing technological sophistication, all in the context of relative domestic tranquility as
compared with other technological societies, stands at the threshold of a new
era of affluence. Against this background, it is especially critical that all
members of society share in this growth, in some way. Wage earners, those
with small and limited incomes, must have some medium whereby they may
conveniently invest relatively small sums of money in equities, in order to
benefit from the upward trend in the country's economy.
Many Canadians place their savings in what are essentially fixed rate
of return investments, such as, savings accounts, bonds, insurance and so on.
The insurance company, which holds the individual's savings, may itself invest in equities. But, regardless of how well the insurance company's investments fare, the policy holder receives a fixed return, that is, one that may be
considered to be guaranteed.' Thus, the person who places his savings with
an insurance company, or a pension plan,2 is far removed from the equities
which these intermediaries may purchase.
However, through the medium of a mutual fund, the individual enjoys
a direct interest in the underlying equity shares of corporate stock, which is
proportionate to his investment in the fund. Thus, the mutual fund is the
vehicle which may bring 'participatory capitalism' to the small investor.
The average wage earner may not be inclined to purchase shares of
stock directly through a stockbroker. He may, for example, be discouraged by
his lack of sophistication in the field of business. His alternative may therefore
be the mutual fund. The concept of the mutual fund, when conducted with
integrity and honesty, has much to offer the small investor. Through the pooling of funds, it is said that he can obtain the benefits of professional investment, while, at the same time, he may invest relatively small sums of money
on a periodic basis.
*Member of the 1970 Graduating Class of Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
I Report of The CanadianCommittee On Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts,

Provincial and Federal Study (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) [hereinafter The Report],
112, 113.
2 Conventional plans assumed, as opposed to variable or equity based types.
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The small investor need not be concerned with the collection of dividends and the subsequent re-investment of these funds. The mutual fund will
collect and re-invest the dividends for him in the form of additional fund
shares. Many funds will perform this service by investing the dividends at the
net asset value of the mutual fund shares without adding a service charge.
In addition, most mutual funds may be employed as vehicles for a Registered
Retirement Savings Plan, whereby the investor may place a certain maximum
amount of pre-tax income into the fund, for retirement purposes, and benefit
by deferring his income tax to a period when his marginal tax rate will likely
be at a lower point.3
Because of the principle that every saver or investor ought to have an
opportunity to participate in the growth of a dynamic economy, and in view
of Canadian Governmental fiscal measures, 4 designed to encourage people,
especially the small investor, to purchase Canadian securities, the mutual fund
industry should be viewed as infected with the character of a quasi-public
utility. It should be regulated in conformity with this assumption.
In fact, it would appear that a great majority of mutual fund investors
are those who invest small amounts of money in the form of regular payments.
The Porter Report found that "The average value of the 300,000 mutual
fund shareholders' investments is about $3,000 and an increasing proportion
of them have invested by making regular payments rather than lump sum
purchases. ' 5 The Porter Report concludes that, on balance, mutual funds
"play a constructive role in mobilizing savings for equity purchases, particularly from smaller investors." 6
The small investor, whose options are somewhat limited or restricted,
comes to the mutual fund of necessity. He should be treated with careful
consideration and fairness. The mutual fund sales organization or salesman
should not take advantage of the fact that the small investor places his faith
in those who appear to be far more knowledgeable in investment-related
matters than he is. The small investor may be naive. For this reason, it would
be wishful thinking on the part of the government to assume that disclosure
alone is adequate to secure the objective of investor protection. The object
should be to devise a framework of regulation which will bring 'capitalism'
within the grasp of all citizens, at a reasonable cost, based on the efficient and
honest operation of the industry. This would give the investor the confidence
to invest his money in a mutual fund. He would then feel that he is participating in the growth of the country, possibly protecting himself from the
effects of inflation, and perhaps providing himself with an annuity plan with
some measure of inflation protection. In addition, he would benefit from the
economies which flow from the pooling of the savings of many people.
3 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 79B. Tax Reform Bill, C-259, 1971,
s. 146 retains the concept, and, in fact, increases the amount of tax-exempt income
which may be placed in a fund.
4 Registered Retirement Savings Plan as described in the text. The Dividend Tax
Credit, Tax Reform Bill C-259, 1971, ss. 82, 121 is designed to encourage investment
in Canadian Securities, and to provide the greater benefit to shareholders with lower
marginal tax rates.
5 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen's

Printer, 1964) at 255.
OId. at 256.
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SALES CHARGES AND MANAGEMENT FEES
The vast majority of the sizeable mutual funds charge a fee of approximately 8.5% of the amount invested for entry into the fund. 7 The mutual fund
itself, is a skeletal organization, which is created by a separate organization
known as a management company, which usually performs the investment
advisory function plus the administrative duties of the fund. The sales distribution organization is sometimes one with the fund, but may also be a separate organization or corporation, though controlled by the same individuals
who control the management company.
The mutual fund agrees to pay the management company a percentage

fee for the services it performs, and this fee is calculated on the average net
asset value of the fund over a period of time.
The fee is regulated to an extent by the Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC). An OSC policy statement provides for a maximum fee scale
based on net assets administered, with the maximum of .75% on a
fund of $100,000,000 or more. The .75% figure does not determine the

entire compensation scale for a fund of $100,000,000, because the higher fees
are permitted on the sums below that amount. Thus the management company may charge 2% on the first million dollars, 13/% on the next two million
dollars, and so on.8
Sales charges are regulated by the exercise of discretion on the part of
the OSC,with the Commission tending to deny the approval of a mutual fund
prospectus where the fee exceeds 90/o.
"A STUDY OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FUNDS INDUSTRY"
The Canadian Mutual Funds Association commissioned Professors G. D.
Quirin and W. R. Waters to conduct a study of the mutual fund industry, to
7 The Report, supra note 1, at 45.
8Id. at 319 for full text of the Securities Commission policy statement issued
February, 1968. See also National Policy No. 7, infra.
A number of policies have been announced by the provincial securities administrators and by the Ontario Securities Commission since the publication of The Report.
Some of the policy statements were formulated in response to issues raised by The
Report.
A partial list of relevant policy statements dealing with mutual fund regulation
follows:
Canadian Provincial Securities Administrators, National Policies, April, 1971:
National Policy No. 7, Mutual Funds: Management Fees.
National Policy No. 8, Mutual Funds-Computation of Net Asset Value Per Share.
National Policy No. 9, Mutual Funds-Forward Pricing, Sales And Redemptions.
National Policy No. 10, Mutual Funds-Redemption of Securities.
National Policy No. 11, Mutual Funds-Change of Management-Change In
Investment Policies.
July 30, 1971:
National Policy No. 23, Mutual Funds - "In-House" Funds.
OSC Policies, April 5, 1971:
OSC Policy #3-06, Examination Program For Salesmen.
OSC Policy #3-07, Registration Of Part-Time Salesmen.
OSC Policy #3-11, Dual Licensing: Life Insurance Agents.
9 The Report, supranote 1 at 20, 40.
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serve as a contribution or submission to those preparing The Report. The
result was, A Study of The CanadianMutual Funds Industry.10 Quirin and
Waters present the rationale for the industry viewpoint with regard to the
important issues pertaining to the regulation of mutual funds.
Quirin and Waters state their basic premise, that, given the ingredients
of competition and free entry into an industry, the price paid by the purchaser
will be the outcome of free competition amongst those offering the product.
Free markets, predicated on the balancing action of supply and demand, result
in the fairest prices. This is based on the assumption that people act in terms
of their economic self-interest. The purchasing public may voice its opinion
by refraining from purchasing a product which is overpriced. This is more
efficient than the operation of government control, wherein the democracy
of purchasers voting with their pocketbooks is replaced by government which
acts arbitrarily. The government is sometimes influenced by a vocal minority
which drives it in the direction of policies which upset this sensitive balance
created by the forces of free competition interacting with the skeptical
purchaser."
The principal question to be determined is whether or not the mutual
fund industry is governed by the genus of competition which will allow for
the creation of the optimum price for the service provided. Quinn and Waters
assert that "the greater the number of firms already in the industry and the
greater the potential for entry, the less likely it is that existing firms can act
in non-competitive (synonymous with undesirable) fashion.12In particular, the
less likely the possibility for control of supply and price."'
Quirin and Waters examined the concentration ratios for mutual fund
management groups for a period from 1957-1967, and found that the trend
of concentration was on the decline, and that therefore competitive forces are
at work in the industry. "For example, the share of the largest management
group dropped from 41.9 to 33.8 per cent while the share of the four largest
groups dropped from 81.5 to 64.7 per cent and the share of the eight largest
dropped from 95.3 to 78.7 per cent."' 3
It should be pointed out that these statistics bear out a high degree of
concentration, despite a measure of attrition over the years. The fact that one
management group accounts for 33.8 percent of the industry's assets, while
the four largest include well over half of all the assets, represents a significant
degree of concentration. Quirin and Waters admit that these levels are still
above the standard desired by a prominent economist, for a competitive type
of industry. But, they say, "the important fact in our view is that the concentration ratio has been dropping consistently over time."
10 (Toronto: The Canadian Mutual Funds Association, 1969) [hereinafter The
Study].
The Preface to The Study, at iv, indicates that it was financed by The Canadian
Mutual Funds Association. At the same time, the preface by the CMFA Chairman of
the Board, iii, explains that, while the authors Quirin and Waters received the views
of individuals in the CMFA, they were free to reject them.
"1 Id., paper 2, at 1-3.

Id. at 4.
18Id. at 8.
12
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We may question whether it is appropriate to thus infer from the trend?
The years covered, 1957-1967, represent one of the longest and most extensive bull-market periods in the entire history of the stock market. In an
environment of growth, it is to be expected that the marginal organizations
will gain in sales, at the expense of the proportionate share of the leaders. The
test of the trend is what occurs in a long period of declining markets. We
would assume that the larger management groups will retain a stronger proportionate share of the total industry assets, while a larger proportion of the
attrition, stemming from the excess of redemptions over new sales of fund
shares, will be suffered by the smaller funds. It would have indeed been more
helpful if Quirin and Waters had related their statistics on trends of industry
concentration to stock market trends.
To complete the picture of a mutual fund industry, characterized by
healthy competition that will make for firms competing to give the purchaser
the best and most reasonably priced product, we are told by Quirin and
Waters that there is 'ease of entry' on the part of new firms, which can only
enhance healthy competition. "The requirements for entry do not appear to
be onerous; existing firms do not appear to have important cost advantages."' 4
However, it is important to distinguish between the 'entry' of entirely
new management companies, and that of new mutual funds. The former is
not as prevalent as the latter. Quirin and Waters fail to clarify this important
distinction, and, in their discussion of 'ease of entry', it is not always clear
whether the object is the mutual fund itself or the management organization.
In the case of the 1957-1967 statistics regarding industry concentration, they
are dealing with management organizations. They then go on to talk about
the 'ease of entry' of 'new firms' and it isn't apparent whether the mutual fund
itself, or the management organization is meant. Later, they refer specifically
to the small mutual fund, and say that it too can gain economies of scale in
portfolio management and sales force administration, and then continue. "This
is possible when the fund is operated as an appendage to an organization's
primary activity, as in the case of funds sponsored by some investment
dealers and trust companies."' 5 If the referent is the mutual fund, as opposed
to the management organization, then 'ease of entry' proves little or nothing
with regard to competition and concentration.' 6 This 'ease of entry' is restricted to existing mutual fund management organizations, and to other firmly
established existing organizations with ample capital and resources, which
can afford the risk, and can multiply mutual funds without too much difihiculty. This however, is not the context for a truly competitive environment
fostered by 'ease of entry'! This is a peculiar 'ease of entry' restricted to a
small select group of financial institutions, either mutual fund management
companies, or those which function as management companies.
An examination of the new open-end funds that were either incorporated
or commenced selling shares in 1968, will indicate that the bulk of these are
represented by mutual funds spawned by well established existing mutual
14 Id. at 14.
5 Id.

16 In the latter part of the discussion, Quirin and Waters refer to ease of entry in

respect of management groups. The Study, supra note 10, paper 2, at 15.
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fund management organizations, simply adding another fund to their stable
of funds, or trust companies or stock brokerage houses using the facilities of
their existing organization to finance and promote the new fund. These represent well established financial institutions, as opposed to those which could
be described as independents starting from scratch. By examining the 1969
FP Survey of Investment Funds, and segregating those funds that were not
mentioned in the 1968 FP Survey of Investment Funds, it appears that only
10 funds can be found which were either incorporated in 1968 or commenced
share sales in 1968. Seven of these were organized by significant financial
institutions, and three of these appear to be 'independents', though one cannot
be certain that these do not also 'belong' to substantial financial institutions.
The seven represented total assets of approximately $56,450,000, while the
three represented only $1,500,000 in assets. It should be noted that the bulk
of the $56,450,000 of the seven 'appendage' funds, comprises the $54,000,000
of The AGF Special Fund,17 which is merely an additional mutual fund started by the American Growth Fund Management Ltd., which ranked as the
third largest Management Company in Canada in 1967.18
Another aspect of the 'ease of entry' question should be examined.
Frequently, the mutual fund distribution function is carried out by the management company, and even where the functions are separated and carried
out by two entities, they are in effect, one. The U.S. SEC, in The Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth19 makes some important
17 The FP Survey of Investment Funds (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Limited, 1969)
30, 39.
18 The Study, supra note 10, paper 2, at 14. The FP Survey of Investment Funds,
1969, reports that the American Growth Fund had $311,900,000 in total assets.
The 7 funds started by well-established existing organizations are:
1. AGF Special Fund Ltd.
2. All-Canadian Revenue Growth.
3. I.O.S. Venture Fund Ltd.
4. Savings and Investment American Fund Ltd.
These four funds were started by existing mutual fund management companies
already managing a number of well-established prominent funds.
5. Investoflex-which is really 3 different funds-the Equity; Income; and International Growth Fund. This is under the management of the International Trust Company, affiliated with the First National City Bank. This fund has since merged with
another fund.
6. Canadian South African Gold Fund.
7. Mosslaw Growth Fund Ltd.
These last two funds are managed by stock brokerage firms.
The three ostensible independents are:
1. Abercorn Growth Fund.
2. Beacon Growth Fund.
3. Magna Carta Fund Ltd.
Uncertain:
1. Marlborough Fund. Appears that it is run by a management company which is,
in effect, a securities firm.
Two additional funds which could have been included among the seven, but were
not, because they are used by insurance companies for variable insurance plans:
1. Maritime Life Assurance Co. Growth Fund.
2. Seaboard Life Insurance Co. Accumulation Fund No. 1.
These two for all intents and purposes should be viewed as mutual funds. However,
we have not included them in our comparison.
0
1 H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1966) [hereinafter The Policy
Report] 123.
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revelations in the course of discussing the profit margins of the two entities.
The management company, with its fee for advisory and other services,
usually showed very substantial pre-tax profit margins, while, in most instances, by contrast, the margins of the distribution companies were very
low, and many even operated at a loss. The Policy Report concludes that the
management fee, in effect, subsidizes the sales operation, and that this works
to the ultimate benefit of the large mutual fund organization, with the sizeable
net asset value. "This practice tends to give the larger investment advisers a
substantial advantage
over the smaller ones in competition for sales of mutual
' 20
fund shares.
The Policy Report emphasizes the fact that the large fund, which generates substantial brokerage commissions, may use the commission to reciprocate, and reward with brokerage business the brokers who sell the fund's
shares. It should be noted that, in effect, the minimum brokerage fees on
large volume transactions up to $500,000 are excessive, because they are
simply multiples of the 100 share board lot fee, and fail to make allowance
for the fact that a 10,000 share trade generates little more expense for the
broker than a 100 share trade.2 1 The excess brokerage is traded off for either
services provided the mutual fund by the broker, such as research or net
asset computation, or, in the form of rewards for selling the fund shares,
which in effect, constitutes an additional sales commission. The large fund
generates a large sum in commissions, so that, after paying for the services,
there is, in the form of brokerage commissions, an ample sum to be viewed
as 'reciprocal' payment, that is, payment to the broker of a bonus commission
for selling the fund's shares. Therefore, The Policy Report concludes, "The
use of brokerage commissions as compensation for sales of fund shares places
small funds and small fund complexes at a distinct competitive disadvantage
in connection with sales of fund shares.122 It is thus apparent that the large
mutual fund organization can use its 'size' as a kind of 'muscle-power' to
increase its net asset value, and reduce the prospect of serious competition
from new entries in the field, offered by new management companies.
Quirin and Waters in their attempt to show that the mutual fund
industry functions in a manner that is truly competitive, contend that the wide
variety of 'acquisition costs' among the various funds, is an indicator of true
competition.2 3 A large number of funds have no sales charge, and a few fall
in the spectrum between the large number charging nothing, and the large
number charging 8.5%. The Study proudly displays a chart, titled, "Distribution of Canadian Mutual Funds By Acquisition Charges, 1967", which shows
20 Id. at

125.
Report, supra note 1, at 95-96, for a discussion of volume discounts. Since
the publication of The Report, the NYSE and the TSE have adopted negotiated commission rates on the portion of transactions above $500,000. The effect of this move
in the way of making volume discounts possible in certain transactions remains to be
seen.
22 Supra note 19 at 180. Cf. also, The Policy Report at 165 and 222. Cf. re "Commission Structure and Reciprocal Business", The Report, supra note 1 at 89-96.
2
3 The Study's euphemisms reflect its viewpoint. Quirin and Waters are careful not
to refer to them as 'sales charges' because that would create the impression that the
90/o in its entirety goes to the distributor and salesman. This, of course, is the fact.
Cf. The Report, supra note 1, at 39.
21 The
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that almost 30 funds had a zero acquisition charge. Quirin and Waters proudly
indicate that 36% of the newer funds had a zero acquisition fee.24 Indeed, a
manifestation of massive competition in the mutual fund industry.
However, in another part of The Study, in connection with a different
issue, Quirin and Waters speak disparagingly of the role played by the noload mutual funds in the Canadian mutual fund industry. We are told,
Canadian funds with zero acquisition charge account for only a small proportion
of the assets of Canadian funds - less than 6 percent at the end of 1967 ...

Between 1962 and 1967, the size of the industry almost tripled and presumably
investor awareness of funds' existence increased also. Viewed in this light, the
increase in the market share between
1962 and 1967 of the zero acquisition
25
charge group appears quite modest.

It appears that between Paper 2 and Paper 7, the much vaunted
competition all but disappeared! The desire on the part of the authors of
The Study to have it both ways, explains the fallacy in their statistics as to a
wide distribution of sales charges. This variety of sales charges exists only
when we look at numbers of funds. However, when we examine distribution
of asset value, the opposite conclusion becomes apparent. The asset value
is by far the more significant figure, because that indicates the sales charge
being paid on behalf of the largest sum or total of investors' money. In reality,
the basic and representative sales charge rate is between 8 and 9 percent of
the total paid, the latter being the highest rate. Those who charge this basic
rate represent 61.9/o of the number of funds. But, they represent 91.8% of
the dollar amount of all mutual funds. 26 This figure illustrates the fact that
the funds charging less than 8% have remained the smaller ones. If Quirin
and Waters are indeed correct, in their assumption as to the prevalence of true
competition in the Mutual Fund industry, we would believe the reverse to be
the case. That is, the mutual funds that charge the least would grow at the
expense of those who 'overcharge'. It should be noted that the mutual funds
have not limited themselves to a maximum of 9% because of charitable impulses or considerations of competition, but because of the exercise of discretion on the part of securities administrators who would not accept prospectuses with higher sales charges. 27
The mutual fund industry is indeed characterized by competition, but
not the type that would tend to bring sales charges down to reasonable levels.
On the contrary, the competitive force is exerted by the brokers and sales
organizations, that is, those who sell the fund shares, to increase the sales
charge. They concentrate on selling the particular fund or funds which pays
24 The Study, supra note 10, paper 2, at 21; and chart at 20.
25 Id. paper 7, at 4. Cf. paper 2, at 21, note 23, where Quirin and Waters attempt

to reconcile the contradiction in employing the no-load fund statistics to derive two
contradictory conclusions.
206The Report, supra note 1, at 48.
27 1d. at 20, 40, re the role of the securities administrators and the exercise of their
discretionary powers to reject higher sales charges. It appears that 9% has been accepted
as the top rate, generally, in the U.S. almost as if by custom. The 9% maximum is the

only sales charge maximum specification in the U.S. Investment Company Act, 1940,
and it is with reference to Periodic Payment Plans (Front end loads) in see. 27(1).
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them the highest sales commission. 28 The Policy Report, discussing the competitive pressures on sales loads, says,
Differences in the compensation paid to retail sellers of fund shares play a most
important part in the competition for sales. During the past 16 years, competition
for dealer favor has exerted significant upward pressures on the general level of
mutual fund sales loads.. 29
The Policy Report, in citing the landmark study, The Wharton Study0 for
its conclusion that the higher the sales load, the larger the fund, or the fund
complex, quotes The Wharton Study, which says that "... many of the
larger (mutual fund) systems ...have found that high retail commissions,
which induce greater selling effort, tend to increase the rate of sales of investment company shares." 31 This is borne out by the Canadian fund statistics
cited above, and noted by Quirin and Waters, to the effect that the funds
with the lower or zero sales charges have not grown as much as those with
the conventionally high sales charges.
Quirin and Waters attempt to justify the sales charges of mutual funds,
which are considered by the U.S. SEC to be inordinately high when considered in the light of sales commissions in the securities industry generally.
We are concerned with those on lump-sum or voluntary purchases, as opposed to the 'contractual plan'.
What Quirin and Waters fail to discuss, is frequently more significant
than what they choose to analyze. With all of the statistics and figures analyzed in The Study, it is surprising to find no comparison between the sales
charges of mutual funds, and those for stocks listed on the Exchanges or
traded in the over-the-counter markets. There is no reference to the sections
in the SEC publications, where exhaustive comparisons are made between the
commission schedules for various securities on the one hand, and mutual
fund sales charges on the other hand. The Study fails to refer to the comprehensive and convincing data, showing that mutual fund sales charges are
the highest in the securities industry, with absolutely no justification in terms
of the valid overhead costs, or the services provided the investor in return
32
for the sales fee.
In an extensive statement presented before a Congressional Committee,
Manuel Cohen, the former SEC Chairman, documented the fact that the
mutual fund industry extracts the highest sales charges in the securities
industry. It should be noted, regarding comparisons with securities transactions executed on the New York Stock Exchange, that these minimum
commission schedules are roughly comparable with the Toronto Stock
Exchange rates. While the vast majority of the significantly large mutual
fund sales charges cluster around the 8.5% level, Cohen concludes that mutual
fund sales charges are in many instances, nine times as much as those involved
28 Id.at 48.
29 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 208.
30 A Study of Mutual Funds, prepared for the SEC by the Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce, 1962 [hereinafter The Wharton Study].
31 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 72.
3

2E.g., id. at 209; "D. Comparison of Mutual Fund Sales Loads With Costs of
Other Securities Transactions."
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in investing in individual securities of comparable quality. A 'round trip' trade
of a $38.00 security, which is comparable to the benefit derived from the
mutual fund fee because
it covers an 'in and out' transaction, is approximately
33
2/o on the NYSE.

The Policy Report indicates that the sales charge on $4,000 invested
in a mutual fund is over 4 and 3/4 times the 'round trip' NYSE commission. ' 4
The Policy Report also explains that the disparity is even greater, when we
consider the fact that the mutual fund purchaser is also paying the brokerage
fees as a hidden charge for the trading of the portfolio securities comprising
the mutual fund shares. Furthermore, it should be recalled, as mentioned
above,3 5 that these brokerage charges frequently represent additional sales
compensation, because they are often employed to reward brokers who sell
the fund shares.
The Policy Report, in assessing the mutual fund industry's defense of
its sales charge structure, says, "Secondly, in comparing mutual fund sales
charges to the charges for buying and selling other securities, they assume that
a mutual fund investor who wishes to sell his shares needs the services of a
broker-dealer to find a buyer." This is not the case, because the mutual fund
itself redeems the shares, whereas the stock broker does perform a significant
function, in that the floor broker, or over-the-counter trader must find somebody to act on the other side of the transaction.3"
The securities underwriter, who acts as a principal, usually takes about
4% of the proceeds, less than half of the 8.5% of the mutual fund dealer.
When calculated the same way for the mutual fund purchaser as for the purchaser of an underwritten security the mutual fund dealer realizes a 9.3%
shar& of the proceeds. The underwriter, who acts as a principal, is indeed
earning his fee, because he must make an intensive effort to distribute the
stock within a limited time or period, and if he fails to distribute his allotment, he must keep the shares as inventory on his shelves, with attendant
interest costs, plus the risk of decline if the market turns down, not to speak
of loss of reputation if he is a member of a selling group and fails to sell his
allotment. The mutual fund 'underwriter' or distributor assumes no comparable risk in his operations, yet charges the purchaser more than twice as
much as what the securities underwriter charges.
It is unfortunate that Quirin and Waters fail to direct their attention to
the above mentioned comparisons. Let us examine their rationale for the
mutual fund sales charges, which appear to be extremely high when viewed
in the context of the securities industry, and against a background of services
rendered. Quirin and Waters discuss the alternative to mutual funds as being
33
Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967, Part I, Hearings Before The
Subcommittee On Commerce and Finance of the Committee On Interstate And Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, 1st Session, at 50, 51.
The NYSE is in the course of attempting to persuade the SEC to authorize a formula which would increase minimum commission rates on certain transactions. The TSE
too is studying changes in the minimum rates charged by its members.
34 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 211.
35 Id.
36Id.
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"Do-It-Yourself Portfolio Management" and conclude that this is a costly
procedure. It entails an expenditure of time on the part of the investor, and
time is money. This, they explain, is in addition to the costs of periodicals
and investment services. 37 It would be appropriate to mention that some of
the best investment publications are obtainable without cost, such as, for
example, bank letters, which discuss trends in money supply and their relationship to stock prices, economic trends and profit margins. Annual reports
are obtainable without cost from publicly traded companies. Stock brokers
too, offer statistical materials and company and industry studies, at no extra
charge, all for the approximately 1% brokerage fee.
It is misleading to discuss the cost of managing one's own portfolio
within the context of an attempt to rationalize mutual fund sales charges.
These sales charges are generally unrelated to the mutual fund management
function, which is portfolio selection and diversification of investments. The
sales organization and the salesman benefit from this fee. This approach,
however, is consistent with the impression that mutual funds strive to convey,
to the effect that through some mystical process, the high sales charge is
related to the performance of the fund in a positive way.38
The Quirin and Waters' contention that the 'do it yourself' investment
portfolio entails costs that are considerably more burdensome than those involved in mutual fund investment, should be approached with a degree of
skepticism from the vantage point of the demands made on the investor who
would attempt to select the mutual fund most suitable for his needs. With
the plethora of mutual funds, with their varying features and conditions as
outlined in the prospectuses, and different performance in different types of
markets, the time and effort involved in researching and selecting a fund, represent a real cost. Constant surveillance is necessary, because the investor's
financial considerations may change, as may the fund's performance and
management. This year's star performer may turn out to be next year's
laggard. The alert mutual fund investor must be prepared to make a significant expenditure of time, in order to choose and to monitor his mutual fund,
and as Quirin and Waters contend, time is equivalent to an expenditure of
money.
While Quirin and Waters have an affinity for numbers and statistics,
they somehow omit mention of the crucial figures, which might convey something of the actual configuration of the sales fee and its relationship to the
management fee. The latter comprises the only contribution, a part of which
goes to provision for advisory service and portfolio management. The relevant
figures follow. When one purchases mutual fund shares for $1000.00 with a
sales load of 8.5%, the dollar figure for the sales load is $85.00, and $915.00
is the actual amount which goes into the investment pool. Assuming brokerage
fees for the investment of that particular sum of money into common stocks,
at regular round lot prices, the commission is, at 1%, $9.15, which means
that, in round figures the actual investment of portfolio securities represented
by that $1,000.00 mutual fund purchase is $905.00. The management fee,
37

The Study, supra note 10, paper 7, at 8, 9; paper 4, at 1, 2, 22.
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Cf., The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 214, 215.
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assuming a charge of .50%, is approximately $4.57.39 The $4.57 sum is the
only one which provides for investment management, as opposed to the
$85.00 sales charge. Assuming a level net asset value, the single acquisition
sales charge, is equivalent to more than seventeen years of management fees.
This will convey some idea of the extent to which the extremely large sales
charge, dwarfs, by comparison, the management fee which represents the
only moneys which are being paid by the investor for the carrying out of the
portfolio management function. It is thus grossly misleading to justify the
extremely high sales charge, by relating it to the cost of 'do-it-yourself'
investing.
Quirin and Waters offer additional ex post facto rationalizations for a
generous level of sales charges. The mutual fund salesman makes an important contribution to the purchaser in the provision of guidance, investment
counsel and servicing. 40 The sales charge also pays for the advice the salesman
offers the purchaser on income tax advantages with regard to his investments,
"and the role of investments in estate planning." 41 The SEC Report of Special
Study of Securities Markets, discusses the damage done by mutual fund
salesmen who distribute legal forms, without advising their clients of the need
to consult a lawyer.4
Quirin and Waters contend that a C.M.F.A. (Canadian Mutual Funds
Association) study shows that the salesmen made "an average of 2.7 contacts
totalling 4.1 hours with lump sum purchasers prior to purchase", and salesmen
reported "an annual average of 3.2 after-purchase contacts totalling 3.5
hours." 48 We may question the value to the purchaser of the time thus spent,
and Quirin and Waters concede that many of the additional contacts were for
the sake of inducing new sales. The Report however, tells a somewhat different story, when it indicates that "in approximately half of all cases the sale
was made in a single visit."' ' This does not compare with an average of 2.7
contacts prior to purchase. If this were the case, then the 'approximately half'
who required more than one visit, would require an inordinately large number
of visits, to bring the average up to 2.7. It might indicate, if the other half
indeed required almost five visits, that these were cases where salesmen had
to alter their sales tactics to persuade those who may have good reason, in
their circumstance, not to invest in mutual funds.
Quirin and Waters avoid making the pertinent comparisons between
mutual fund sales charges and those of other securities, thereby enabling them
to evade the relevant consideration of a comparison between what the securities broker offers for his approximately 2% commission as opposed to what
the mutual fund salesman offers, and the relative costs of each. It is important
to consider, with reference to costs, that much is made of the fact that the
investor in mutual funds need not be concerned with stock certificates and
80 Cf.

Id. at 52, 53, and at 53 note 129.

40 The Study, supra note 10, paper 7, at 2-6.
41 Id.
paper 6, at

1.

42

The Special Study, Part IV, at 133. Cf. infra p. 108 on mutual fund salesman's

qualifications.
43

The Study, supra note 10, paper 7, at 6.

44 The

Report, supra note 1, at 53; also at 509.
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other bookkeeping. The authors of The Study do mention that in the case of
contractual plans, custodial fees are charged, for safekeeping and record
keeping. The administrative and safekeeping duties performed by the funds,
are not paid for by the sales charge. They are derived from the management
fee, and in some cases are an extra charge on the mutual fund assets. Quirin
and Waters do not discuss the fact that stockbrokers provide safekeeping for
a client's securities, notify him of rights that must be exercised, collect dividends for him, all at no extra charge, but as part of the service provided by
the original 1% brokerage fee on the purchase of the shares, and the possible,
but not necessary assumption that the client will sell the securities through the
facilities of the stockbroker.
As to service, the stockbroker provides a far more extensive and continuous service for the investor, beyond the point of the sale, than does the
mutual fund salesman. The broker stands ready to provide stock market information and quotations on a daily basis. He provides investment advice at
critical turning points in the market, and is buttressed, in many instances by
an extensive research department, sometimes augmented by economists. As an
example, of a service which is indeed commendable, the analysts of stockbrokers, Mills, Spence & Co. pored over the November 1969 White Paper
on Tax Reform for an entire weekend following the Friday night release of the
proposals, so that their clients would receive, in the Monday morning mail, a
twenty-eight page comprehensive report on the investment implications of the
proposals! All of this, for 1% or 2% and not 9.3%45
Quirin and Waters develop additional questionable arguments to indicate
not only justification for the currently high sales charges, but to prepare the
ground for increases. As the mutual fund sales begin to saturate a good deal
of the population, they may reach the same plateau that has characterized the
life insurance market recently. And that represents a kind of maturity where
a large number of individuals already hold mutual fund shares, and thus more
effort will be required to effect a sale. Therefore, the mutual fund industry
will be constrained to consider the possibility of raising 'acquisition charges'
so that they more closely approach the higher fees characteristic of the life
insurance industry.
Quirin and Waters warn against introducing regulations which would
preclude such an increase in sales charges which may very well be required
in the future. 46 They express concern about this matter, because they want
the level of compensation to be high enough so as to attract salesmen to the
mutual fund industry as opposed to other sales careers.
45 Original Mills Spence Report, dated November 9, 1969, and a 15 page "Followup" dated November 9, 1969. Quirin and Waters refer, almost as an aside, to "the
advice of a security brokerage dealer's customer's man" as being 'free' "only because
the commission charged on the sale or purchase of securities is high enough to cover
the cost of effecting the transaction and providing the advice." The Study, supra note
10, paper 4, at 1. They fail however to deal with this in terms of the relationship
between brokerage charges for securities transactions on the one hand, and sales
charges of mutual funds, on the other hand; together with a comparison of the services
rendered in each of the two instances.
46
The Study, supra note 10, paper 5, at 9, 10.
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In analyzing statistics on mutual fund salesmen's wages, Quirin and
Waters bemoan the fact that 58% of those surveyed were in the under $2000
per annum class, with only 11.2% receiving more than $10,000. They compare the mutual fund salesmen's earnings with those of other salesmen such
as securities salesmen and real estate brokers. "Because of the simluarity of the
background and training for all of these classifications, (this would include
securities salesmen) we would expect their levels of remuneration to be quite
similar." While acknowledging factors which would make for lack of comparability in income, the authors refer to the fact that the "mean values" of
for securities salesmen were higher than for mutual
employment income
47
fund salesmen.
We would seriously question the assertion that the training of securities
salesmen is in any respect comparable to that of mutual fund salesmen. Securities salesmen are subject to far higher standards than are the fund salesmen.
The stockbrokers of TSE member firms must pass the Investment Dealers
Association sponsored Canadian Securities Course, which includes lectures
in addition to written work, and a final examination.4 8 Many Canadian brokers
are also subject to the U.S. regulations, and must pass an examination administered by the U.S. N.A.S.D., which includes an extensive section relating to
the NYSE. Thus, it is not entirely fair to compare the two sales categories,
because there is a great disparity in the educational requirements. 49 It may be
suggested that perhaps the low income levels of mutual fund salesmen is
attributable to inefficiency in training salesmen, and in hiring or 'overhiring'
salesmen. The investing public should not be expected to compensate the
industry for its lack of efficiency. It should be noted that to raise the income
level of the large $2000 per annum class, to let us say, double, together with
increasing the other levels, would apparently require at least a doubling of
the currently over generous sales commission, to approximately 19%. Is this
what Quirin and Waters mean to suggest?
The Study emphasizes that the salesman indeed performs a most useful
function, because he brings mutual funds to the attention of those who require
them for their investment portfolios. And, this is an important service, which
cannot be provided without cost. The Study praises the minority of economists who recognize the importance of selling costs. They explain that "we
must be prepared to accept the cost of providing salesmen to carry to the
individual information about his insurance and savings requirements, or let
those requirements go unsatisfied." This assumes a generally ignorant investing public, which is simply unaware of the existence of mutual funds, and
47 Id. paper 8, at 7, 8.
48J. C. Baillie, The Protection of the Investor In Ontario, 8 Canadian Public
Administration, No. 3 at 325, 422, where he describes the examination of the Canadian
Securities Course as "an efficient device to screen out applicants not prepared to expend
the necessary effort to learn about the business." Cf. fn. 641, where "a failure rate of
about 21 percent" is indicated. Cf. infra, p. 652, for discussion of the CMFA examination for mutual fund sales candidates and the fact that The Report provides no figures
on the failure rate.
49 CF. infra, p. 650 for a discussion of the very minimal requirements for mutual
fund salesmen.
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requires salesmen to effect the revelation of this "mystical secret" known as
the mutual fund.50
But, this view does not appear to be consistent with that of another
paper in The Study, where the authors refer to the sophistication and knowledgeability of the mutual fund investing public. They tell us that mutual fund
investors, as a group are well-informed customers, because they flock, in
droves, to the most superior product. That is attested to by a relationship
between inflow of funds and rate of return. There is a relationship, the authors
contend, after performing gyrations with higher mathematical formulas, between performance of a fund and the level of sales.
Firstly, if investors are sufficiently adept to put their money into the funds
that are showing the best rate of return, one would think they could find
out about mutual funds by means of their own resources. One cannot attribute this selection process, contended for by Quirin and Waters to edification
by salesmen, because many of the largest Canadian funds sell through 'captive'
sales forces,"' comprised of salesmen who offer only the 'house' funds, for
better or for worse, without inculcating in their clients a sensitivity to comparison shopping as to performance and rate of return. Secondly, we have,
above, cited from the mutual fund studies which indicate that the principal
determinant of fund size is the sales charge, with those offering a higher sales
'bite' gaining more adherents from among the salesmen and brokers.
In rationalizing the sales charge, Quirin and Waters attempt to demonstrate a great need for the function that the salesmen perform. They say,
If everyone had perfect, or even equal knowledge of the future performance of
securities available in the market, there would be no need for professional investment management any more than there would be a need for medical practitioners
(other than surgeons) in a world in which everyone had equal knowledge52of the
implications of his own symptoms and the efficacy of all available drugs.

The identification of the treatment by a doctor, with the advice of a mutual
fund salesman is misleading. This is because medical knowledge is so specialized that a medical student, after his first week of classes in the first year
of medical school, cannot treat or diagnose an illness, while a mutual fund
salesman will sell mutual fund shares as early as the first week he is engaged
by a sales organization."3
THE CONTRACTUAL PLAN
The contractual plan raised some doubt as to the legitimacy of certain
sales charges. The Report aptly defines this type of plan as "any periodic
payment plan for the purchase of mutual fund shares or units under which
the amount deducted for sales charges from payments made during an initial
period is greater than it would be if the same total amount of sales charges
were evenly deducted throughout the life of the plan." 54 Contractual plans are
50 The Study, supra note 10, paper 3, at 3, 4.
51 The Report, supra note 1, at 33.

52 The Study, supra note 10, paper 5, at 4.
53 Cf. infra, p. 653.

54 The Report, supra note 1, at 360.
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divided into those where the entire initial payment constitutes the sales charge,
as in the prepaid sales charge plan, or where a disproportionate amount of
commission is carried by the initial payments, as in the traditional contractual
plan. Quirin and Waters set out to promote the most extreme version of this
advance commission payment scheme, the prepaid sales charge plan. This is
where the entire first payment consists of commission, with no part of it
going towards the acquisition of underlying shares. A portion of this downpayment is credited to the subsequent payments as the portion representing
commission. It should be noted that these shares are purchased from a 'plan
sponsor' company which acts as an intermediary between the purchaser and
the mutual fund, and charges a service fee for its bookkeeping expenses. The
authors suggest that the average charges over the life of such a plan, in the
case of a $20.00 minimum payment plan, would be, in round figures 12%.5i
While we have distinguished between the two types of 'contractual'
plans, Quirin and Waters seem to lump them together, and refer to them
under a general category of 'prepaid sales charge plans', without distinguishing between the case where the entire initial charge is commission, or where
a portion, usually about fifty percent represents such a charge. The authors
appear to be very careful not to employ the term 'front-end load' plan. Perhaps this designation would tend to indicate too clearly the preponderance of
commission which is deducted from the first year's payments.
The authors attempt to prove that despite the effect of the prepaid sales
charge and the service charge, the disparity between the 'contractual' plan
and the "pay as you go" (we would call it the 'level-load') in terms of rate
of return is not as great as one might think, given an allowance for the passage of time. While the contractual plan rate of return will never equal the
'level-load' plan of return, the gap is narrowed considerably after ten years of
payments. It should be stressed that Quirin and Waters are assuming a
10.7% portfolio return as the medium for nullifying, to an extent, the effect
of the heavy sales and service charges. In the example used in the authors'
tables, it would take four years for the rate of return to equalize the effect of
the sales and service charges. For example, in the first year, the return is a
negative figure of 70%; the second-21.7% and so on, and by the fifth year,
a positive figure of 2.7% is achieved. The authors claim, in comparing the
yield as between the contractual and the level load investment, that, "The
extent to which yield is sacrificed is negligible if any substantial time period
is considered, as comparison of realized rates of return over 10 to 20 year
periods indicate." 56
First, we may question the assumption of a 10.7% annual rate of return.
That figure is based on "the mean portfolio yield over the period 1960-65"
of 34 Canadian funds.157 Aside from the fact that one ought not project
yield for twenty years in the future, on the basis of a five year period, the
period chosen, marking an extensive Bull-Market trend, is indeed a biased
one. One need only examine the record of mutual fund performance for 1969,
when many of the prominent mutual funds lost from 10% to 35% of their
0 The Study, supra note 10, paper 5, at 13.

06 Id. at 16.
57id. at 13.
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value to learn that a one year period may reveal a less profitable market result.
This fact should be evaluated against the background of the negative return
during the first four years of the operation of such plans. And, even the five
year performance records, showed a number of minus signs, while the plus
signs were not followed by significant gains. The gains, in most instances were
not of the order of 10.7% per annum.58
Even admitting the validity of the long term projections, which may
indeed be questioned in terms of future periods which may bring a radically
different investment climate, they should be viewed against a background of
the record of actual investor practise with regard to these 'contractual' funds.
The erratic nature of the security markets, plus the inordinately high
level of sales charges on the initial payments, mean that the investor who
redeems prior to the completion of the plan, stands to suffer a severe penalty.
He will absorb the commission charges on the 'unpurchased shares' as well as
the loss resulting from any short term market reaction. Even according to the
Quirin and Waters' figures, he will be a net loser if he redeems within the
first four years of a contractual plan. And, assuming a rising market, he will
not gain the full benefit from the attendant appreciation because the disproportionate sales charge has reduced the portion of his investment which is
actually working for him in the marketplace. The authors' justification for
such plans on the basis of 10 and 20 year projections, is nothing short of
utopian, given the statistics of early redemption and non-completion of plans,
and even an elementary knowledge of the steadfastness of long term investment programs where the demands on the family income have reached and
are continuing to reach astronomical proportions. The evidence regarding the
large number of early redemptions of these contractual 'shares' even in the
first year, and failure to complete the plans, has been well-documented by the
American sources and by The Report. These sources also reveal investor
ignorance as to the negative financial consequences of early redemption and
failure to complete a plan.5 9 It appears strange that these pertinent sources are
not tapped by authors who appear to be committed to finding out what actually occurs in the industry.
It is not difficult to understand why The Report contends that the investor stands to lose upon adopting such a plan, while the principal beneficiary
is bound to be the salesman. 60 Quirin and Waters, however, believe that what
is good for the salesman is good for everybody.
The prepaid sales charge provides the funds from which the salesman receives
the bulk of his compensation in respect to that sale. Providing the bulk of his
compensation at this stage recognizes the fact that the bulk of his work is performed to seek out the would-be client and to effect a sale.61

It is indeed strange that the same authors who justify the extravagant
normal sales charge by presenting statistics in respect of the service provided
58

How Mutual Funds Fared, The Financial Post, January 18, 1970, at 16.
9 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, V. 4, at 185. The Policy Report,
supra note 19, at 323. The Report, supra note 1, at 365, 366. And, supra note 33, testimony of Manuel Cohen, at 62.
60 The Report, supra note 1, at 362.
61 The Study, supra note 10, paper 5, at 6.
5
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the client by the salesmen who are reputedly versatile tax experts and estateplanners, will at the same time contend that the salesman who sells a contractual plan should be paid commission from currently uninvested funds,6 2
because he has already performed his service with the conclusion of the sale.
Why do Quirin and Waters in this context, dispense with 'service' as a justification for commission charges, and, in effect, deny it? In the case of the
contractual plan, follow up servicing on the part of the salesman is more relevant than in the case of the sale of a 'level-load' fund, because the salesman
ought to educate his client to maintain his payments, so that he will not be
penalized after paying the higher commissions on the initial payments during
the first year. The answer is very simple. Quirin and Waters realize that the
salesmen do not wish to service such an account, because they have already
collected the bulk of their commission in the early stages of the plan's operation, and there is little motive for them to return, once they have extracted
the exorbitant prepaid commissions from the client.
The authors then try to show that the 'contractual plan' must be a good
thing because other fine reputable industries promote it, such as life insurance, where the bulk of commission is subtracted from the first year's premium. It is interesting that in this particular instance, the authors acknowledge
an argument developed by the S.E.C., and refer to the Public Policy Report,
in a footnote.08
The Policy Report suggests the distinction that in the case of insurance,
the purchaser receives the immediate benefit of 'protection' in the event of
death, to the extent of the full amount of the policy. The authors are satisfied to mention this point, because they cite The Policy Report's admission
that the greater part of the premium represents the savings portion and not
the protection cost. We may then summarize the authors' argument as being
that if the life insurance industry misrepresents its policies to the clients, so
that they accept a very low return on their savings portion of the insurance,
which is larger than they are led to believe, it is therefore perfectly acceptable
for the mutual fund industry to insist on being allowed the luxury of a similar
type of misrepresentation.
Quirin and Waters then employ a most surprising argument when they
say that "The purchase of a house partially financed by a mortgage involves
transactions costs which have an effect similar to prepaid sales charges.""s
Even aside from the authors' reluctance to calculate realized returns, such as
rent, the comparison appears to be imprecise. Firstly, in the case of the home,
the purchaser enjoys the full value of the entity he is purchasing, in contrast
to the 'front-end loan' plan, where the purchaser enjoys the investment benefit of a small portion of the money he has already paid. Secondly, and more
important, one need not be an economist to realize that shelter, a home; is
a basic necessity. Investment in mutual funds can only be described as a function of discretionary income, or that which is left over after paying for neces22 These

funds may never be invested, (funds in the sense of money on which or

for which advance commission has been paid) and the odds are that in most cases
they will not be invested, on the basis of the sources cited above, note 59.
03 The Study, supra note 10, paper 5, at 7, note 7.
04 Id. at 22.
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sities such as food and shelter; but is not something to be acquired by means
of borrowing, and incurring interest costs, etc. Perhaps Quirin and Waters are,
in reality, saying that a salesman who is sufficiently glib to obliterate this distinction in the mind of the prospective investor, indeed deserves to be paid a
substantial commission, and in advance!
The authors fail to confront the massive evidence referred to above
which indicates the large percentage of contractual plan investors who discontinue the plans and redeem prematurely. Instead, they contend that the
salesmen try to evaluate the purchaser's ability to complete a plan. The evidence gathered by the S.E.C.'s Special Study of the Securities Markets indicates to the contrary, and there is no reason to believe that Canadian salesmen, in the absence of any significant restraints on their activities, would tend
to be more careful or more restrained in their sales efforts, than their American counterparts.
Following the above assertion, Quirin and Waters say that despite the
salesman's care in assessing the potential purchaser's ability to compete, it is
inevitable that some will be constrained to redeem, prematurely, and will thus
suffer loss. But, they suggest that such an eventuality is not as serious as it
might seem, because of the following:
Given the omnipresence of sales representatives for other assets, many individuals having to discontinue mutual fund contractual plans prematurely would, in
the absence of such plans, have acquired alternative assets on which the acquisition charges and resultant loss would have been even greater. 65

This suggests that, since the 'gullible client' might have spent the funds
on a defective used car, or may have been deprived of his funds by means of
some other deceptive practice, we, the sellers of 'front-end' load funds, are performing a significant service, because, although he may pay an exorbitant
price, he is nevertheless left with something to redeem. This is a dubious recommendation for an industry which purports to provide investments characterized by security and stability.
MANAGEMENT FEES
To understand the locus of the problem with regard to the regulation of
management fees, it is essential to again refer to the structure of mutual
fund companies. It has been explained above6 6 that Canadian mutual funds
are externally managed, which means that a management company organizes
a separate entity, the mutual fund. The mutual fund then enters into a contractual relationship with the management company, whereby the latter provides investment advice, and frequently administrative services, in exchange
for a management fee, which is usually approximately .50% per annum
calculated on the average value of the mutual fund's net asset value. The
distribution company, the sales outlet, is often a branch of the management
company, or is incorporated as a separate entity. Some management companies have organized a number of mutual funds, each directed towards a
different investment objective, and some also provide investment advisory
65 Id. at 29.
66Supra, p. 601.
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services for institutions such as pension funds, or for sizeable individual
accounts. In contrast to Canadian funds, a number of American funds, some
very sizeable, such as the M.I.T. Fund, are internally managed, which means
that the Mutual
Fund and the management company operate under one cor7
porate roof.

The management company, because it has given birth to the mutual
fund, believes that it therefore enjoys a total proprietary interest in the Fund,
and may 'operate' it as it wishes. 68 In this view shareholders in mutual funds
are not 'shareholders' in the corporate sense, with a voice in the affairs of the
fund, but are merely individuals who have conveyed their money to the fund
to be managed by a management company in which they have confidence. A
second view, which is the most tenable from the pragmatic perspective of
investor protection, is that the mutual fund, following its creation, is an entity
separate from the management company, which ought to bargain at arm's
length with such company to obtain the best contractual terms conceivable
with the management company. 69 The management company should serve the
best interests of the mutual fund, instead of allowing the mutual fund to be
viewed as a mere appendix of the management company without a voice with
which to express its own self-interest.
If the first view holds, then there is no reason for a mutual fund to have
a Board of Directors at all, let alone an independent Board, to scrutinize and
oversee the fund's relationship with the management company. Despite the
corporate or organizational form, the mutual fund is a mere satellite of the
management company. In the second view, since origins do not determine
present relations, the mutual fund is, in reality, an entity independent from
the management company, which purchases various services from that company, and does so only on terms which are most advantageous to the mutual
fund; that is, only for so long as the management company performs its services to the reasonable satisfaction of the Mutual Fund Board, which acts as
a 'watchdog' in overseeing the way in which the management company performs its functions. The efficient and effective functioning of an independent
Board of directors is one of the best guarantees that the investor will receive
the fairest return for the investment advisory and administrative expenditure
paid out for him by the mutual fund. This is the approach which will most
likely insure that management companies retain a competitive stance, and
operate with adequate expertise and at reasonable cost, so as to retain the
allegiance of the independent members of the Mutual Fund Board of Directors,
As long, however, as the management company may view the mutual fund
as a dependent 'dog' tightly tethered to it with no place else to go, then there
is no competition, regardless of how many of these mutual fund complexes
come into existence every year.
Since Quirin and Waters adopt the tethered dog theory of the relationship between a mutual fund company and the management company, their
07 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 102-105.
(8 Id. at 102, for the effect of non-arm's length negotiation on the level of management 09fees.
For a distinction framed in somewhat similar terms cf. The Report, supra note
1, at 104. Cf. also The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 76 for a rejection of the concept of the first view.
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discussion of 'competition' in the industry that is said to guarantee a wide
variety of options to the fund purchaser, is not convincing.70 Yet, they continue to weave their hypotheses around an illusory competition, which is difficult to detect. Quirin and Waters contend that management fees "were
determined primarily by competitive pressures, and that they tended to
cluster'71around 1/2 of 1 percent of net asset value, as they do in the U.S. as
well." It is somewhat paradoxical to find that there is competition as to
management fees, but that they all happen to cluster around 1/2 of 1/0. 72
If true competition obtained, the result would be a wide range of management fees. Presently, there are few funds charging less than 1/2 of 1 per cent.
Quirin and Waters explain that in the case of "a competitive economy,
with effective competition between alternative management companies, economic theory predicts that the management fee will be forced to a level related
to the marginal cost of providing the service,.. .73 If this is so, one wonders,
in view of the authors' position that shareholders have nothing more than
'depositor' status in a fund 74 which is effectively controlled by the management
company, how effective competition could ever exist as between alternative
management companies? If the mutual fund is a mere puppet of the management company, why must the latter compete with anyone?
Quirin and Waters in justifying a position that the management fee not
be regulated, suggest the extent of the financial requirements for providing
adequate investment advice, in that security analysts and portfolio managers,
etc. would have to be provided from the proceeds of the advisory service
fee. 75 However, in this crucial area, Quirin and Waters fail to provide us with
any analysis as to the actual expenditures of management companies for
personnel who generate the investment counsel, in relation to what they
receive in advisory fees. Yet, they conclude that, "We are more concerned
with the possibility that the competitive level of management fees is inadequate to support first-class portfolio management than with the possibility of
excessive fees." They go on to explain that the control over management fees
on the part of securities administrators, "is bound to discourage innovators
who might provide more intensive and expensive management and which
'76
might provide more than commensurate benefits to fund shareholders.
How can they make such a statement, when they present no evidence as to
the percentage of the current management fee which is expended on improving the research service, and the percentage which goes to enhancement of
70

The Study, supra note 10, paper 1,at 10, 14, 15.
Cf. supra pp. 604-609 for a discussion of the Quirin and Waters contention that
competition rules in the mutual fund industry.
71 The Study, supra note 10, paper 10, at 2.
7
2As to the wide variety of management costs, it should be noted, for example,
that the internally managed M.I.T. fund reported an expense ratio as low as .18%, for
1965. The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 103. It should be appreciated that a small
fraction of a percent will represent a large sum of money in the case of a mutual fund
with assets totalling hundreds of millions of dollars.
73 The Study, supra note 10, paper 10, at 2, 3.
74Id. paper 1, at 14.
75 Id. paper 10, at 4.

71Id. paper 10, at 6.
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the management company's profit margin? On what basis do they exude
such confidence that any extra charges for management fees will be translated
into improvement of the investment advisory research function? It is, in fact,
possible for a management company which is a division of or an affiliate of a
stock brokerage firm, to carry out the investment management function, with
little or no outside investment advisory expense over and above the normal
research department service provided by a brokerage firm. 77
It is also possible for a management company to provide investment
counsel to a mutual fund, for example, of $20,000,000 for little more than
a basic expense of $75.00, which is the cost of a statistical service on U.S.
and Canadian stocks, such as The Canadian Business Service, which makes
specific Buy and Sell recommendations based on security analysis principles.
The only other requirement may be a security analyst or stock trader, for a
cost of about $10,000.00 per year. The investment advisory fee, at 1/2 of
1% would be $100,000.
Quirin and Waters reveal their awareness of the fact that management
companies receive research reports and advice from brokerage firms, but that
this too requires an adequate staff to evaluate the various recommendations
and reports which are sent by brokers regarding securities. 78 Here too, the
crucial question is whether they in fact do spend the advisory fee income to
provide an adequate staff to evaluate incoming research studies?
The authors also discuss the economies of scale in investment management, that is, to the effect that one management company can manage a
portfolio tice its current size, for example, at very little additional expense.
However, it indicates that many Canadian funds have not reached the size
where economies of scale are a relevant factor. 79 Yet, the economy of scale,
should be a factor which would justify an expectation that the management
companies of large funds ought to share the benefits of this economy with the
mutual fund shareholders.8 0
Despite their recognition of this factor, Quirin and Waters make no
recommendation that this should be a consideration in the setting of fees, and
that a sliding scale should be instituted, among the larger funds, to ensure
that the mutual fund purchaser is not overcharged. Instead, one of the essential recommendations is that "management and administration fees remain
free to move to those levels dictated by competitive forces:" 8' Since these
competitive forces do not exist, it essentially means that a management company may organize a fund, and charge whatever fee it pleases, subject to no
controls on the part of government, on the part of the Mutual Fund Board of
Directors, or on the part of shareholders; with the exception of the suggestion
77The "Martin Report", commissioned by the NYSE, proposes that brokerage
firms divest themselves of their mutual-fund subsidiaries and thus avoid the conflict of
interest inherent in the possibility of earning commission income by causing the fund
to turn over its porfolio. Terry Robards, Martin Remedy: Shake Up Big Board, The
New York Times, August 8, 1971, section 3 at 1, 2.
78
The Study, supra note 10, paper 10 at 4.
70 Id. at 5.
80 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 94.
81 The Study, supra note 10, paper 17, at 16, 17.
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offered by Quirin and Waters that "no changes
be made in the fee rate with'82
out prior approval of the fund shareholders.
THE REPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON
MUTUAL FUNDS AND INVESTMENT CONTRACTS:
SALES CHARGES AND MANAGEMENT FEES
The Report appears most convincing where it deals with what may be
termed the 'technical' standards for mutual funds, designed to protect the
public from the misappropriation of money or securities, outright fraud and
gross dishonesty. This would, for example, include such areas as: custodial
and inspection requirements;8 minimum capital requirements; 84 a formula for
computation of net asset value per share;8 5 and, confirmation of purchase. 80
We shall however focus our attention on those aspects relating to whether The
Report, if implemented, would provide the framework whereby the investor
will indeed receive a 'dollar's worth' for every dollar he invests, be treated
fairly, and be properly apprised as to the nature of the particular commodity
he is purchasing.
It is important to consider the fact that, while The Report was prepared
by a Committee consisting of six members, 87 with the assistance of a staff, it
was issued as a unanimous report. No minority report was included, nor is
there any record of any ostensible individual dissent. This should lead us to
the conjecture that a minority viewpoint lies hidden in the interstices of the
lengthy document produced by the Committee and its staff. It will be methodologically useful to consider The Report in the light of a 'battleground'
wherein two opposing forces contended. A meaningful analysis of The Report
requires that we attempt to unravel the two separate layers of argument.
While we recognize the limitations of labelling as such, we shall, in some
instances, in the form of a theoretical construct, distinguish between two
separate reports, re-articulating each one in terms of its underlying philosophy: The hypothetical Report A will represent the viewpoint of the mutual
fund industry and of those who would severely restrict the role of government regulation; Report B, the model of the residual minority report, is committed to an investor-protection thesis, and recognizes the need for a meaningful level of government regulation.
It is important to distinguish between these two separate and distinct
approaches, because The Report ought to be considered as a political document, which attempts to appear to lend credence to a variety of approaches.
The analysis here suggested will help separate appearance from reality, and
will indicate when The Report is awarding victory to one side, while offering
mere rhetoric as a concession to the other side.
821d. at 17.

83 The Report, supra note 1, at 228.
84 Id. at 192.

85 Id.at 458.
86 Id.at 556.
871 d.preface, at ix.
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Report A begins with the assumption that a mutual fund is a "vehicle
whereby money is managed for a fee and may be withdrawn at any time by
its owner." Thus, the mutual fund, through the arm of the management company, provides a service for those who entrust their funds to it.88 The Report
explains that it accepts this definition, as opposed to the one which views the
mutual fund as an enterprise separate from the management company, and
which consists of an investment portfolio operated for the benefit of its participants. The Report adopts the Report A view, which confers on the mutual
fund shareholder the mere status of a depositor. A purchaser of shares in a
mutual fund should expect to have little more voice in the affairs of the company than that which may be asserted by one who deposits his savings in a
chartered bank. In purchasing a mutual fund share, he has delegated his power
over his funds to a management company. In practical terms, a mutual fund
does not function separately from its management company. In fact, the
management company provides the protection of the fund assets, in place of
the fund itself.89
The U.S. Investment Company Act, 1940, requires that a mutual fund
have a Board of Directors, of whom 40% are independent, and this is, primarily, with reference to the management company. Legislation under consideration by Congress, would make this provision more effective by changing
the criterion of exclusion from "affiliated" to "interested" persons. 90
Report A decides against a statutory requirement for a Board of Directors at all, let alone an independent Board of Directors. Report A enumerates
three reasons for ruling out such a requirement:
1. The American experience would indicate that it has not solved the
three basic conflict of interest problems created when a management company
deals on a non-arm's length basis with a mutual fund, and these are;
a. management compensation;
b. allocation of brokerage commissions; and
c. the setting of the sales load.
2. Because the management company controls the proxy machinery of
the mutual fund company, the requirements designed to ensure an independent directorship, would have to be rigorous to an intolerable extent.
3. The very requirement of a "Board" itself, would impose an inconvenience on the Trust Companies which have organized mutual funds. "It
would result in the isolation of these funds from the ordinary operations of
trust companies through their treatment in different ways." While a Board
could be made mandatory, Report A is not satisfied that the results would
be beneficial.
In sum, Report A questions whether "government should require that
persons without a direct stake in the success of the operation be put in a
88 Id. at 104. Cf. supra p. 620.
89 Id. at 150.
0
0Id. at 162, 164. Cf. S.2224, 91st Congress 1st Session, May 27, 1969, at 2,
3, for definition of 'interested' person, and at 10, 11 for the amendment which would
replace 'affiliated' with 'interested' persons.
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position where they are expected to pass on the business judgment of the
management company."'91 While agreeing that an independent Board would
be a good thing, Report A feels that it should be set up on a voluntary basis,
and not by legislative fiat.92
While Report A is victorious in gaining acceptance of its conclusion,
Report B is granted the luxury of rhetoric. Report B says,
...there are certain obvious advantages to a mutual fund and its shareholders in
a board of directors that includes at least some members who are independent of
management. These members can assist management by subjecting its decisions to
informed and impartial review, perhaps with comments based on backgrounds in
other business activities. It can protect shareholders or unit-holders93by ensuring
that management properly performs the duties for which it is paid.

Aside from protecting the interests of the public shareholders, independent
directors can serve as an effective sounding board for the evaluation of the
management company's investment policies. An investment manager, whose
vision may be blurred by involvement with the stock market on a daily basis,
and influenced by the currents of emotionalism which engulf those close to
the market, could benefit from the perspective and cool detachment of experienced businessmen serving on the Board of Directors. 4 It may be true that
in the case of industrial companies, many directors are appointed who simply
know very little about the industry, and serve only because of their status and
reputation. However, in the case of a mutual fund company, a capable, experienced businessman has usually had experience with the capital markets, and
is capable of serving as a watchdog to protect the interests of the mutual fund
shareholders. 95
Perhaps the assumption underlying The Report's reluctance to require a
Board of Directors, is based on the above mentioned concept of the mutual
fund investor as a depositor who deserves no representation through any
directorial apparatus, simply by virtue of being a shareholder. Thus, a mutual
fund shareholder is not to be likened to one who purchases shares of a stock
that is, for example, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The latter is a
part owner of the business. However, the former is not an 'owner' in the
same sense, and we would explain this by reference to the definition of the
distinctive feature of the mutual fund, which is that the holder of a mutual
fund share "is entitled to receive, on demand, an amount determined by
91 The Report, supra note 1, at 164.
92

Id. at 165, 166.

93 Id. at 161.

94
A careful reading of G. Kaplan and C. Welles, The Money Managers (New
York: Random House, 1969) will show that even some of the most talented mutual
fund managers tend to be guided by one or two dogmatic principles which are effective
in one type of stock market environment, but totally ineffective in another, with the
result that they are not sufficiently flexible to adjust their investment policies to new
developments. This may serve as a partial explanation as to why certain talented money
managers did so well in the 1966-68 stock market, and then outperformed the stock
market averages on the downside in the 1969-70 market.
Regarding outside directors, perhaps some provision could be made so that a
director refrain from involving himself in an investment decision relating to a corporation on whose Board he serves; or, at least that the mutual fund Annual Report identify
the fund dirctors who also serve on the Boards of portfolio corporations.
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reference to the value of his proportionate interest in the mutual fund." 96 It
is true that the holder of a share in an industrial corporation, for example,
may sell his share; however, there is no guarantee that he will receive, as
consideration, the net asset value. He may receive more or less. We may
therefore conclude that it is this distinctive feature which permits Report A
to conclude that the 'ephemeral' shareholder of a mutual fund can perform
his surveillance function, simply by redeeming, if he is dissatisfied with management. It would seem obvious that since this is the distinctive feature of
the mutual fund, as highlighted by The Report, that this would be the basis
of the justification for not requiring a Board of Directors, at all. If this is
the case, we shall see that Report B refutes the rationale for not requiring a
Board of Directors, which rationale is apparently adopted by Report A in
arriving at its conclusion.
Report B contends that the availability of the right to redeem alone is
inadequate to provide continuing scrutiny, for the following reasons:
1. Redemption is far less successful than continuing opposition as a
shareholder.
2. To posit the right to redeem as a method. of scrutiny would be to
assume:
a. That the shareholders possess the ability and knowledge to review
management's activities; and
b. That full disclosure of the relevant activities of management can be
provided.
Neither of these assumptions can be made.
3. The theory assumes too much in two additional respects:
a. That the shareholder will read what is sent to him.
The weakness of this assumption will be obvious when it is realized that the
or unable to
mutual fund shareholder is, by nature, one who is unwilling
97
participate in the management of his own investments.
b. That the mutual fund shareholder would actually redeem.
But, it must be remembered that he may lose money if he does so. If he is a
contractual plan shareholder, he may lose the 50% of his total first year's
purchase, that being the amount which represents commissions; and if a
voluntary plan or lump-sum purchaser, 8.5%. This is aside from a possible
decline in net asset value, which would make it an inopportune time to redeem.
4. Even if we are to assume that a certain number of shareholders will
be sufficiently knowledgeable to redeem, it is no solution for the wealthy and
those most in need of
sophisticated to drop out of the mutual fund, leaving
98
protection, within the fold of the mutual fund!
05 Cf. infra p. 627 for a specific suggestion as to a source of directorial talent.
90 The Report, supra note 1, at 113.
97 We shall see below that this fundamental assumption made by Report B is not
recognized at all by Report A when it would attempt to rely on competition as a means
of governing the level of sales charges and management fees.
0

soThe Report, supra note 1, at 158-60.
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Thus, Report B undermines the basic assumption upon which Report A rests
its conclusion not to require an independent Board of Directors, or even a
Board of Directors as such.
The contention that the American legislative solution, requiring independent directors, has not proven especially successful, does not justify the
position taken by Report A. Developing a statutory solution to a problem is
frequently an evolutionary process, rather than an absolutely imminent solution. In this case, we may benefit from the experience in the U.S., and take
note of the proposed legislation designed to close the loopholes in the requirement of independent directors. 99
The assertion that it would be 'inconvenient' for the Trust Companies to
set up a separate Board of Directors for the mutual funds they organize,
should not be doubted. It is indeed far more convenient for the Trust Company to mingle all of its investments, such as mutual funds, trust accounts,
individual accounts, Registered Retirement Savings Plans, and treat them all
as one, in many respects. However, this is not entirely fair to the mutual
fund investor, who pays .75% as a management fee for specialized professional attention to the fund. One cannot criticize consultation between various
divisions of one Trust Company, but treating all of the Trust Company's
investable funds as one entity, can work unfairness on the fund investor. For
example, if the fund's 10,000 shares of Bell Telephone will be purchased as
part of the total of 50,000 shares for all of the Trust Company's units, the
fund may, in the end result, pay more for the 10,000 shares than if it purchased the shares on its own separate account. The Trust Companies ought
to be required to maintain the separate identity of their mutual funds, each
fund governed by a separate Board of Directors to outline a consistent investment policy and oversee its operation, in order that it be managed as an
individual unit or division, instead of as a 'stepchild'. It would also simplify
the regulatory problem, so that the mutual fund unit could be kept separate
from the Trust Company, enabling it to be regulated by the Securities Commission. These are only some of the 'benefits' which would flow from requiring the Trust Company mutual fund to maintain a Board of Directors.
Report A resists the adoption of a 40% independent Board of Directors
requirement, similar to what is in force in the U.S., because of the fact that in
Canada a small number of directors serve a number of companies that are
affiliated with one another. Thus, many potential directors would be excluded
from serving on mutual fund boards, because they would fall under the
category of 'affiliated' or 'interested' persons.100 For example, if the Canada
Permanent Trust Company organizes a mutual fund, and then appoints the
Vice-President of the Bank of Nova Scotia as an independent director, he may
be excluded if it is found that the Bank of Nova Scotia owns a large percentage of Canada Permanent stock.
99Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967 Part 2, Hearings Before The Committee On

Banking And Currency, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Statement of Professor
Ernest Folk III, beginning at 1001. Cf. at 1004-06 for an excellent discussion on the
improvements that will result from the 'interested' persons definition in the proposed
legislation.
1O Cf. sources referred to in notes 90 and 99, for U.S. solution for insuring the
independence of the specified percentage of the Board of Directors, i.e., 40%.
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It could be argued that this is probably one of the most convincing
reasons for, in fact, implementing the independent director requirement for
mutual funds. It might, as a favorable by-product, afford a partial solution
to the problem of 'in-breeding' in Canadian corporate management. It would
be meritorious, for example, if mutual funds would be constrained to seek out
directorial talent from among the faculties of our universities and colleges. It
may be suggested that there are many talented professors who are scholars
in various areas of finance and commerce, who could make a very significant
contribution to the management of mutual funds, and to the protection of the
shareholders' interests.
The concept of the appointment of directors who are to devote themselves to protecting interests outside the narrow purview of the managerial
group, is gaining adherence in the field of corporate and securities law.
The Toronto Stock Exchange Act, 1968-69, provides for the election of two
public directors to the TSE Board of Directors, and the two nominees must
be approved by the Lieutenant Governor (the Cabinet).lo' While this is not
analagous to the case of the mutual fund board of directors, it is asserted that
a board of an institution with a quasi-public utility or public interest character, must include members who shall owe a duty to the generally 'unrepresented' public, and not to be beholden to the 'control' group.
As though to compensate for its triumph with regard to the Board of
Directors, Report A allows Report B to adopt the American provision which
requires that the management contract be placed before the shareholders for
approval every two years. The approval shall be by majority vote. Also, the
shareholders should be given a right to approve, where certain specified
changes are made in the policy of the mutual fund; and these are specifically
enumerated. They are, in the case of "material amendments to the management or distribution contract, or to the statement of investment objectives and
practices; transfer of management contract;" and in two instances, where
required by the securities administrator. 102 Report A approves of this, because
it is consistent with its conception of a mutual fund as a method whereby a
management company sells investment advice. The investors entrust their
money to the management company on a specified basis, and when that basis
is changed they ought to have a voice in such change.
Report B makes this right of approval on the part of shareholders,
meaningful in a certain sense, by giving the securities administrator the power
to require a clear statement of investment
objectives, to the extent, at least,
03
that such precision is possible.
However, it is in the apparatus designed to make the right of dismissal
effective, that Report A asserts itself. It speaks of "dismissal of management
in a very serious case" and the dismissal "of an inefficient management company. 1 0° 4 We note that the approval of management is by a majority vote.
101S. 6(i)(b) and s. 7(2). Text of the Act appears in the preface to the TSE
By-Laws, December, 1969. These provisions leave something to be desired, but the Act
asserts the principle, at least in a general way.
102 The Report, supra note 1, at 168-70.
103 Id. at 452-54.

104

Id. at 169.
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The crucial part of the proposal, is that which provides machinery for replacing the management company, and provision is made for a dissatisfied shareholder to approach a nominee management company which will be prepared
to assume the responsibility of managing the fund, as long as the nominee
places $50,000 in trust to satisfy the escrow requirement, should the shares
held in escrow by the incumbent management be released. The incumbent
management would be obligated either to provide the nominee with a list of
shareholders, or "to send material on behalf of the nominee management and
distribution company to all those entitled to vote at the meeting, on payment
of reasonable costs of mailing."' 1°5 However, incumbent management "would
be deemed to be confirmed unless voted against by the holders of more than
66 2/3 0/b of the shares or units present in person or represented by proxy."' 0 6
This means that the incumbent management could maintain itself in office,
by mustering only one vote more than 33 % of the votes. Report A justifies
the requirement of a 2/3 majority for replacement, on the ground that it
would avoid the possibility of the abuse of these procedures. 10 7 Report B,
however, manages to add, "this (66 2/3) percentage requirement should be
kept under continuing review and increased to a requirement for approval by
majority vote if the relevant provisions prove ineffective to accomplish their
objective."108 But, no criteria are suggested for an evaluative assessment. In
other words, how are we to know whether it is or is not achieving its objective?
There is reason to believe that Report B is justified in its concern as to
the effectiveness of this proposal which is designed to allow for the replacement of the management company. It would indeed be difficult for dissident
shareholders to gather a 6 6 2/3 % vote against management, unless management
was performing its functions in a grossly inefficient manner. And, even if this
were the case, incumbent management possesses all the 'evidence', and the
challengers would experience some degree of difficulty in obtaining such information that would enable it to offer a convincing argument to the shareholders. 109
It is important to note that The Report mentions nothing about replacing
incumbent management with a nominee management company which would
provide the same service for a lower fee. Instead, it refers to inefficiency of
the management organization. Perhaps The Report well realizes that the dissident shareholder will find it next to impossible to persuade any management
105 Id. at 394.
106 Id. Cf. Interim Report of The Select Committee On Company Law, 1967, esp.

at 69-82, for proposals designed to strengthen the position of minority shareholders. See,
The Business Corporations Act, 1970, S.O. 1970, c. 25, ss. 99, 101. Thus, the current
tendencies in the Company Law Reform Movement, would suggest the application of
the principles of shareholders rights, let alone minority shareholder rights, to mutual
fund companies.
0 7
'
The Report, supra note 1, at 394.
1l8 Id. at 397.
109 Cf. id. at 153-58, for an account of what happened when an independent board
of directors of Commonwealth International Mutual Fund lost a proxy battle to oust
the management company, Canadian Channing. The Report, at 157, says that the
Channing victory "as a practical matter was probably due more to the efficiency of its
proxy solicitation through the direct sales force and to the apparent tendency of dissatisfied shareholders to redeem rather than cast negative votes."

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 9, NO. 3

organization to stand for election to replace incumbent management on the
basis of lowering the management fee. It would realize that it could well be
the victim of a cost-cutting challenger in a subsequent contest, and in addition,
would not want the stigma of fostering a 'price-war'. The same reasons which
make it difficult to persuade a Doctor to testify against a colleague in a medical malpractice suit, would obtain in such a case. Furthermore, a management
organization would tend to be reluctant to put up the $50,000, and to bear the
costs of the mailings to shareholders together with the expense of preparing
'campaign materials' in order to make a case for itself, in view of the risk
of losing the contest. The odds in favour of the nominee management would
be very low, because of the fact that it must gain the adherence of two-thirds
of the shareholders, while incumbent management can win with a little over
one-third, and for the reason that fund shareholders, taken as a whole, tend
to be apathetic and favour the status-quo, regardless of whether or not it is
in their interest.
For the reasons stated above, with regard to the contention of Report
B," 0 to the effect that mutual fund shareholders are not activists, by definition,
because they have chosen not to manage their individual portfolios and that
they do not tend to read mutual fund materials mailed to them, and fail to
understand the involved matters relating to mutual fund management, this
proposal is relatively meaningless. An alert and active management can
easily defeat the shareholders, many of whom are apathetic. Thus, this proposal is a poor substitute for a Board of Directors, with independent representation, which can evaluate the management company, and challenge it
wherever necessary.
Thus, we see that Report A rejects any mechanism to control fees
charged by management companies, and condones the non-arm's length
negotiations with the mutual fund, on the basis of which the management fee
is set. It also rejects the requirement to fix a reasonable management fee, as
well as a maximum sales charge.'
Report A pleads ignorance as to any criteria for fixing a sales charge.
In reality, it appears that this Report does not wish to lower sales charges at
all. The Report says that "the costs involved in the sales activity increase
with the rewards to be earned.""n 2 In other words, the higher the sales commission, the more effort or money that will be expended to earn the sales
dollar. We would note that this, however, may not necessarily be an expenditure designed to benefit the investor. But, Report A employs a very definite
interpretation of the relationship between the sales effort and the compensation. It assumes that the sales effort which will increase with a generous sales
charge, will redound to the investor's benefit. Again, The Report-"If sales
charges are high, a salesman may be able to spend a great deal of time with
one customer; if they are low, he may not even be prepared to meet the
customer.""13
110 Cf. supra, p. 626.
111 The Report, supra note 1, at 322, 323.
112 Id.

113 Id.
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There is reason to believe that this is not a necessary equation. It can be
said that the salesman will tend to spend the least amount of time with the
customer that he can, while selling the maximum volume of fund shares on
the 'plan' which will bring him the highest commissions.
One may assert that the higher the sales charges, the less time the salesman will want to spend with an individual prospect, because he will be impelled to move on to reap the generous rewards to be gained by contacting
another potential customer. In place of the Report A analysis, that high
commissions motivate the salesman to spend more time with a customer, and
low commissions the reverse, a more useful result can be achieved by distinguishing between the competent and the incompetent salesman. The competent conscientious salesman will realize, regardless of the particular commission scale, that if he is to build a long-term stable clientele, he has a responsibility to educate the customer and to service his accounts properly. The
incompetent salesman, who fails to appreciate his duty to inform and educate
his customer, will fail to do so even in the face of a higher commission level.
However, the lower sales charge can result in a benefit to the customer, in
that the incompetent marginal salesman will be eliminated.
In this connection, it is interesting to refer to the comments made by a
panel of top officials of mutual fund management and distribution companies,
as reported in an American trade journal. 1 4 The panel members are particularly concerned with the lack of 'servicing' of clients accounts on the part
of some mutual fund salesmen. Herman Friedman, Vice-President of Tsai
Management Company says that the Investors Diversified Service-type of
organization, has a lesser redemption problem than other funds, because,
"These people are drilled into servicing their accounts, whereas a warehousetype salesman, or one who isn't captive, usually won't go back to his client
after his initial contact, for servicing." 1 5 Thus, proving that service appears to
be a function of the sales organization's standards of training rather than of
commission scales!
Donald W. Spiro, President of Oppenheimer Management Corporation,
stated that despite currently high commission rates, a special bonus must be
offered to salesmen, in order to encourage them to do what they ought to be
doing anyway. This is after they have been presumably motivated by the
generous commissions they earn. Spiro says,
We've developed a program through the years of what we call a servicing bonus,
where dealers receive a special bonus at the end of the year for properly servicing
the account. I think too much attention today is paid to what type of sales you
can offer, how large the volume is, etc., instead of coming back to the service.116

Spiro also believes that the salesman today is not doing an adequate job of
informing the client, and he attributes this to lack of training, rather than to
any deficiency in commission schedules.
I think we have to help the salesman on the level of - as simple as it may be making a good sound sales presentation, so when he walks away from the
14 Mutual Fund Marketing Panel, Investment Sales Monthly, September 1969,

Volume 5, No. 9,at 28.
11 5 Id. at 31.

1161d. at 33.
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prospect, the prospect understands what he bought. The average individual now
has no idea of what he bought.117

These industry leaders study the figures of redemptions, and the volume
of return business from existing shareholders, and are disappointed with what
they find. They are concerned with a high rate of 'redemptions', which indicates 'poor' selling, that is, high-pressure sales to those who really cannot
afford to hold an investment in a mutual fund. They attribute this phenomenon to the low standard of salesmen training, and to the lack of proper 'servicing' of a client. The salesman is satisfied when the client purchases the fund
shares, whether or not he understands the commodity he is buying. Thus,
unlike Report A, these top officials of the mutual fund industry, do not relate
this failing on the part of the fund salesmen, to the structure of commissions.
They are well aware that they could not do so because commissions are currently very high, and the industry leaders are equally well aware of the low
calibre of the mutual fund salesman, which is the focus of their complaints.
While Report A contends that management fees can not be set by regulatory authorities, Report B expresses a degree of skepticism as to the way
they are currently being set. Report B refers to the CMFA brief, which asserts
a substantial minimum requirement in fees in order to provide investment
advisory services, and says that it fails to accept this analysis. Firstly, the
CMFA fails to make allowance for the reliance on investment advisory services provided by stock brokerage firms in return for the substantial commission business resulting from the securities trading on the part of mutual funds.
Secondly, an indicator that management fees may be excessive is the fact that
"we have found cases in which a management company charges a higher rate
for the management of a mutual fund portfolio than for the management on
a contractual basis of a portfolio of comparable size on behalf of a large institutional investor.""18 This finding, in the case of the U.S. management companies, has been painstakingly and carefully documented by the studies prepared by the SEC." 9
In this connection it would be appropriate to illustrate the extent to
which the mutual fund industry spokesmen in the U.S. have perverted logic
to avoid the implications of this finding. The SEC has charged that, in order
to show that their profits on providing investment advisory services are
modest, the management companies have presented their profits "as a percent of the capital of the funds" instead of as a percent of the advisers' gross
revenues or invested capital. The SEC submission to the Senate Committee
considering legislative revision of the Investment Company Act, 1940, calls
this an absurd basis for comparison. This peculiar method of calculating profit
margins would be somewhat comparable to a law firm calculating its profit
margin by comparing its earnings with the aggregate of the capital belonging
to the firm's clients. To cite from the SEC statement,
It is the investment advisers, not the funds, which receive these fees and make
these profits and, in many instances, the pre-tax profit ratios of the investment
"7

Id. at 35.

118 The Report, supra note 1, at 323.
110 The Policy Report, supra note 19, at 115-125.
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advisers are very handsome, ranging up to 65 percent or more of their advisory
fee revenues and a far greater percentage of the modest capital required by
12 0
investment advisers.

We should also note, in this context, the above mentioned reservation

as to the portion of the management fee which is employed to benefit the
analysis resources,
mutual fund shareowner by providing adequate securities
121
as opposed to the portion of the fee allocated to profits.
Despite the imperative to formulate a workable system to regulate management fees, as well as sales charges, Report A comes to the fore, and
rejects any suggestion associated with regulation and compulsion. In the case
of sales charges, as discussed above, it is difficult to find a level which would
enable distribution companies to perform their functions. In the case of management fees, it is difficult to analyze expense and profit levels of management
companies, "because of the problems in a separation of revenue and expenses
attributable to other activities of management and distribution companies."' 2
Such a conclusion, would impel one to question whether the management
companies were charging their 'captive' mutual funds a fair fee for advisory
and other services, on the basis of a true assessment of costs plus a reasonable profit margin. This assertion, on the part of Report A, represents a
cogent argument in favour of instituting a more systematic and precise method
for determining management fees. This view, as to the indefiniteness of management company expenses, would tend to confirm the assumption that, frequently, mutual fund management fees serve to 'subsidize' other investment
services provided by the management company for a lower fee. The consequence is that the mutual fund purchaser fails to benefit from the economies
stemming from the pooling of funds and the resultant economies of scale,
to the extent that he should.
In sum, Report A concludes that there should not be any statutory limit
on sales charges or management fees, and that securities administrators should
not continue to be "the arbiters of the entrepeneurial reward to be derived
from the operaton of mutual funds."'1 23 In fact, it is not possible for securities
administrators to set maximum levels for these charges, because there is no
way of knowing what is a proper rate. "They may presently be 'too high' or
'too low'.' 1 24 This, of course, is in contradistinction to Report B, which has
indicated that there is reason to believe that management fees may be unfairly
high, because of the fact that many investment research services, for which
the advisory fee purportedly pays, are being provided by stock brokers'
research, paid for by brokerage commission fees; and because clients other
than mutual funds are paying less for the same investment advisory services
provided by the same management company.
120 Supra note 99, Senate Committee Print, at 1196.
121 Cf. supra pp. 621, 622.
122 The Report, supra note 1, at 322.
123 Id. at 324.
124 Id. at 325.
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REGULATION BY COMPETITION
Report A asserts that "the only effective way to control the level of sales
charges and management fees would be through the operation of competition
in these areas at the consumer level."'1
We shall examine the means by which Report A would achieve the level
of competition necessary to effectively control sales charges and management
fees. A very critical part of the task is to convert the large majority of mutual
fund purchasers to whom the fund is an 'unsought good' to those who view
the mutual fund as a 'shopping good'. The shoppers are the ones who take
the initiative and compare the funds as to sales charges and management fees
prior to making a selection.
We need only cite from a consumer survey that is discussed in Report B,
to show that the vision of a large number of mutual fund investors, sitting
down with pencil, paper and slide rule to compare the differences between the
funds is entirely illusory! The survey concluded that in a majority of cases,
the salesman took the initiative to arrange the interview, and in approximately
half of the instances, the salesman made the sale on the first visit.126 "of
those who replied that the initial contact was made on the initiative of the
salesman, 89% of contractual planholders and 85% of lump sum purchasers
contacted no other organization prior to the purchase."1 2r Since salesmen
comment on comparative performance figures, but not on comparative sales
charges or management fees, Report B concludes that an imposing majority
of persons purchase mutual funds without bothering to make a comparison
as to costs - that is, if they are even aware that they are paying such fees
altogetherl These facts provide little reason for optimism that mutual fund
consumers can be easily instilled with the requisite degree of sophistication
which will provide fertile ground wherein effective competition may flourish.
We tend to become more skeptical of this proposal when we recall the suggestion made in Report B that the mutual fund purchaser, by his very nature,
is one who is not given to careful analysis and contemplation of the alternatives, because, if he were such a person, he would choose to manage his own
portfolio rather than delegate the responsibility to a management company. 28
Let us examine The Report's recommendations which are designed to
overcome the formidable impediment to effective functioning of competition
represented by consumer apathy. To open the avenue to competition,, The
Report unequivocally recommends abolition of retail price maintenance,
which is the current system whereby management and distribution companies
set the level of sales charges as a minimum, and prohibit the sales organizations and salesmen from breaching that minimum level.129
Although abolition by statute of Retail Sales Price Maintenance may
result in discrimination between mutual fund purchasers in that some will pay
125 Id.at 324.

1201d. at 51.
127 Id. at 51, 52.
128 Id. at 159; Cf. supra p. 626. Cf. also, supra pp. 603, 604, 605, re Quirin and
Waters
129

and their assumptions about competition in the industry.
The Report, supra note 1, at 346.
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higher sales charges than others, the proposal has merit, because; "After all,
the right to bargain as to price is available with many items and the law does
not ordinarily assume that unfairness is present if one person is able to obtain
a better price than another.'1 0 Of course, what is more critical, in real terms,
in place of the right to bargain, is the willingness and ability to bargain
effectively! Does pitting the small investor against the large mutual fund
organizations, make for a contest between equal bargaining entities? In other
words, compulsory repeal of the de facto retail sales price maintenance may
not result in an actual reduction of sales charges, leaving us with a distinction
without a difference, or an "improvement" without a benefit to the consumer.
The Report, in all candor, admits to this possibility. It asserts that it
makes no assumption that "the introduction of competition with respect to
sales charges would result in a reduction of sales charge levels." It concedes
that "it could also be argued that the removal of the existing administrative
constraints over sales charges would permit them to increase despite the prohibition of retail sales price maintenance."' 31 This possibility attains credibility
when we remember that the direct sales forces of the mutual fund management and distribution companies represent the major channel of distribution
of mutual fund shares. 132 The large distribution companies with the captive
sales forces, being the major force in the Canadian mutual fund industry,
would be able to control the sales charge regardless of the abolition of retail
price maintenance. The Report considers this possibility and agrees that this
will be the case in the initial stages, but that eventually, independent sales
forces, which are presently a small factor in the industry, 33 and brokers, will
reduce sales charges. This will cause purchasers to put pressure on the distribution companies which sell directly, to lower their sales charges. 134
This, however, necessitates the acceptance of a number of propositions
which are purely hypothetical, for example, that the independent salesmen and
brokers will indeed wish to lower prices to a significant extent, and that the
mutual fund buying public will be sophisticated enough to search out, compare, and purchase the fund which calls for the lowest sales charges.
It would be appropriate, at this juncture, to suggest that the legislative
proposals propounded by the U.S. S.E.C. to retain section 22(d) of the
Investment Company Act, 1940, the statutory retail sales price maintenance
provision, and to place a general ceiling of 5% on sales charges to mutual
fund purchasers, would solve many of the problems inherent in the proposals
of Report A.' 3 5
Manuel Cohen, the former Chairman of the S.E.C., believes that abolition of retail price maintenance may not make very much difference in practical terms, and that placing the ceiling of 5%/o on sales charges will constitute
a far more effective remedy for the consumer who needs the protection. He
130 Id. at 339.

181 Id. at 343.
132 Id. at 33.
183 Id. at 35.
134 Id. at 341, 342.
.35 Supra, note 33, House Committee Print, at 30, 59, 60.
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is not entirely certain of the results of abolition of retail sales price maintenance, but he is certain that the 5% ceiling will result in an immediate and
justifiable across-the-board price-reduction for the mutual fund buyer. In
evaluating repeal of section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act, 1940,
Mr. Cohen also takes note of the major role played by the large mutual fund
complexes which sell through their own sales organizations. As long as there
is only one seller of the shares of a particular fund there can be no price competition. He doubts that competition on the part of mutual fund shares offered
by independent dealers will suffice to reduce the price of shares offered by
those who sell through 'captive sales organizations'.
If the captives were able to keep their sales loads at levels higher than those
prevailing in the competitive sector of the industry, they might be able to attract
salesmen away from the independent dealers. Moreover, principal underwriters of
dealer-distributed funds might conclude that they could escape from competition
and elicit more intensive sales efforts by switching to the captive method of
distribution,
gradually eliminating the independent dealer who offers a variety
136
of funds.

Mr. Cohen then proceeds to voice the arguments in favour of repeal of
s. 22(d). He deals with the argument that repeal of s. 22(d) would foster
competition, thus providing the knowledgeable investor with the opportunity
to obtain the product for a lower price. However, he says that an important
theme of securities regulation has been concern with the welfare of the "unsophisticated investor, who is often the one most likely but least able to bear
the burden of high charges in a competitive market. If it is desirable for

millions of unsophisticated investors of modest means to invest in securities
through the medium of mutual funds, it is also desirable that they should13 not
subsequently have cause to believe that they were unfairly dealt with."'
The Report, however, believes that it is possible to transform the masses
of unsophisticated purchasers into knowledgeable investors, and it proposes
three methods for so doing.
First, through the medium of sales literature offered by the mutual fund
salesman. The Report will set standards for this literature so that it will conform to the principles of fair disclosure. 13 8 However, the oral presentation of
the salesman is more important than the piece of literature he leaves with the
prospect, which, in many instances, very likely remains unread. Sometimes,
the salesman will use the literature as a prop for his sales talk, and merely
refer to those parts of it which support his contentions.
Secondly, dissemination of information by government, with the cost
paid for by the government.' 39 This is of doubtful value, especially when we
recall the efforts of government to publicize programs which it alone administers. We should also note that the disclosure the government may make is
circumscribed by the fact that it has no right to exhibit favoritism for any
130 Id.at

60.

13 7Id. Cf. also supra, note 99, Senate Committee Print, at 1011, 1012, Statement
of Professor Ernest Folk I for an excellent analysis of the problems involved in
repealing retail price maintenance.
188 The Report, supra note 1, at 327.
139 Id.
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particular fund, regardless of how advantageous it might be for the consumer
to consider its merits.
The third technique designed to enhance the investor's knowledge so
that he will be equipped to demand and obtain the mutual fund which offers
him the lowest sales charges and management fees, is the presentation of
adequate and complete information by the communications media such as the
financial press, television and radio. The financial papers would be encouraged to publish comprehensive comparative data about the various funds, to
include material reflecting on the "quality of investment management, sales
charges, management fees and other relevant factors in order to enable purchasers to base their selections on adequate comparisons."'1 40 The Report
insists, quite properly, that the media report the data on a basis by which
comparison can be properly made. Instead of reporting the management fee
alone, the newspaper ought to refer to the expense ratio, because management
companies can hide the true cost of their managerial activities, by allocating
part of the expense to the mutual fund.141
The Report proposes that the regulations of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission be relaxed so as to allow mutual fund advertisements on
television. It should be noted that television advertising simply is not constructed so as to allow the comprehensive detailed presentation of figures with
the degree of comparability which would be required to paint a complete
picture for the unsophisticated investor. Among the many problems raised
by such a proposal, is the great potential for misrepresentation. The very
nature of the brief television commercial, lends itself to a misrepresentation
by omission, when the subject matter is a complex financial instrument, such
as a mutual fund.
The efficacy of the proposal regarding financial newspapers is to be
doubted. Aside from the fact that the circulation of the two major Canadian
financial newspapers is limited, those who do not subscribe to them are the
very ones who ought to be reached. Mr. Manuel Cohen, approached the problem with a great deal of sensitivity towards those who were not sophisticated
businessmen, - as he questioned whether competition would
substantially reduce the sales load for the widow who has never heard of the

Wall Street Journal, who is solicited in her home by a mutual fund salesman to

invest the life insurance proceeds that she has just received, who has no basis for

bargaining with the salesman on any semblance of an equal footing, and who is
unaware of what comparison shopping could do for her in this field. 142

Aside from the above problem, it is doubtful that The Report realistically considered the volume of stastistical information that the newspaper

would have to carry to effectively apprise the people of the relative advantages or disadvantages of the various funds. In this connection, it would be
helpful to consider the type of data reported in an American monthly publication, Fundscope which presents in comparative form all the type of information The Report would consider indispensible and relevant to the individual
who would like to be a careful and sophisticated mutual fund investor. Every
14 0 id. at 333.
14 1 Id. at 331.

142 Supra, note 33, House Committee Print, at 60.
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month Fundscope publishes various articles designed to help the investor
evaluate funds, and each month it includes an extensive comparative statistical section covering most of the American mutual funds on a different basis,
that is from a different vantage point. For example, one month it might cover
'live year performance records', another time, the hypothetical historical operation of a dollar-cost averaging program, or the actual operation of a withdrawal plan over a period of time, covering all of the mutual funds. All of
these are instructive and relevant, because they cover different aspects of
mutual funds, their costs and performance over different periods, and on the
basis of different investment programs and plans. Among the important figures
or categories included in the Fundscope Mutual Fund Guide are, portfolio
turnover rate; management fee; expenses: as a percentage of assets, and as a
percentage of income; distribution of fund assets; total issues held; assets, etc.
One listing of funds in the April, 1969 issue included seventeen categories
of information, and referred the reader to another section or listing which
covered twelve additional categories of facts which the prospective investor
would want to know before choosing to invest in a particular fund.
Once a year, in April, Fundscope publishes an expanded "Mutual Fund
Guide" which contains a most comprehensive listing of information about
mutual funds. It is interesting that each monthly publication is required by
the S.E.C. to include, on the cover, the following legend: "The Statistics in
Fundscope conform with SEC's Statement of Policy and are cleared for use
provided accompanied by Fundscope's 'Mutual Fund Guide', and the appropriate Fund Prospectus." This means that for selling purposes, even when
the salesman provides the Fund prospectus, it is not sufficient to present the
quite extensive statistical material in the Fundscope monthly edition, without
presenting for the prospective purchasers' perusal, the most comprehensive
statement of comparative statistical material, the "Mutual Fund Guide". This
is to suggest that if a specialized monthly publication solely devoted to mutual
funds, is viewed as incomplete in terms of comparability without a large (307
pages for the 1969 edition) comprehensive Mutual Fund Guide, how can a
financial paper be expected to present adequate material to allow for fair
comparison?
It is true that there are many more funds in the United States than in
Canada. However, we should note that there are 136 mutual funds qualified
for sale in Canada. 43 In any coverage of mutual funds, designed to enhance
competition, the American funds that are qualified for sale in Canada should
also be included. It should be noted that under The Report's recommendations, American Mutual Funds will continue to be sold in Canada, provided
that the American authorities relax their regulations so as to permit Canadian Mutual Funds reciprocal rights.'"
It is apparent that the task of presenting factual material about the
mutual funds on a comprehensive basis to educate an unsophisticated investor,
is not one which can be accomplished by materials that may be included on
4
1- 3 The Report, supra note 1, at 727, for number of funds qualified for sale in
Canada. However, a count of the mutual funds listed in the FP Survey of Investment

Funds, 1969, including only the open-end funds, indicates a figure closer to 200.
14 4 Id. at 646.
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one page of a newspaper on an occasional basis. There is reasonable doubt
that such information can be conveyed in any meaningful manner in the span
of a brief television commercial!
We have discussed competition from the point of view of the investor who
would have to become knowledgeable to the extent to which he could exploit
the competition that the various mutual funds would be engaged in by cutting
prices and management fees. In examining this latter half of the equation
suggested by Report A, we suggest that it too suffers from decided weaknesses,
particularly in the absence of recommendations to legislate against mergers,
collusion and price-fixing as between the mutual funds, or the sales organizations. The Report recognizes the fact that the Combines Investigation Act
does not cover mutual fund shares, because it refers to articles or commo145
dities.
The Interim Report on Competition Policy'46 indicates that the Canadian anti-combines legislation is to forbid agreements "which would prevent
or lessen competition in relation to an article or to the price of insurance upon
persons or property."' 147 The Interim Report explains that the Combines Investigation Act does not apply to most service industries, and the financial
institutions would be included in the category not covered by the Act.148
The Interim Report proposes a strengthening of the anti-combines legislation,
with the establishment of a Competitive Practices Tribunal, with civil powers,
to embrace all economic activities, including the 'service-producing' industries.
It stresses that services ought to be included within the purview of the legislation, where other types of "social control" did not apply.' 49 While not referring directly to the mutual fund industry, The Interim Report says "that
the application of competition policy is as relevant to the provision of financial
services as it is to other fields."' 150 However, in a discussion of the minimum
commission rates of the stock exchanges, it suggests that
If the public is in fact best served by permitting these practices to continue, they
should be protected by appropriate regulatory legislation. The regulations should,
however, spell out explicitly what sorts of agreements are to be allowed and under
what circumstances.151

The Interim Report, would suggest that where competition is either not
feasible or possible, the alternative must be that the activity be governed by
145 Id. at 335.

146Economic Council of Canada, July 1969. The Interim Report on Competition
Policy [hereinafter The Interim Report].
.4 7Id. at 51. Cf. also, at 141 for discussion of the history of the statute with
regard to the fact that the scope of the statute is restricted to activities relating to
articles and the price of insurance.
14 8 Id. at 65, 148.
349 1d. at 148.

150 Id. at 153.
151 Id. at 146. The Competition Act, Bill C-256, 1971, s. 91 provides that securities
underwriters be exempt from the agreement and arrangement prohibitions in the Act:
S. 91(1). Sections 16 and 18 do not apply in respect of an agreement or arrangement between or among persons ordinarily engaged in the business of dealing in
securities, that relates only to the underwriting or to the primary distribution of
an issue of bonds, debentures, shares or other like securities.
See also s. 91(2).
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regulation that is designed to protect the public. However, if the position
of Report A were to be accepted, there would be neither effective regulation
of prices, nor true competition. To achieve the latter, The Report would
have to relate the mutual fund industry to the anti-combines legislation, and
recommend that it be brought under the authority of a body such as the
Competitive Practices Tribunal. It should be emphasized that the Report A
recommendation is merely to-prohibit "agreement between a distribution
company and sales outlets through which it affects sales, if the agreement
prevents the sales outiet from reducing its compensation on the sale of shares
' 52
or units in order to produce a commensurate benefit to the purchaser."'
This would apparently not prohibit agreements between distribution compa5
nies, or between sales organizations; nor would it prohibit mergers. " It
would not prohibit active nor tacit collusion between mutual fund industry
leaders to maintain prices at certain levels, or to follow a familiar pattern of
commission rate increases led by one or two of the major mutual fund organizations.
It is interesting to refer to The Porter Report, which is concerned with
insuring the development of competition in the banking industry. It indicates
a realization of the importance of seeing to it that "the habit of formal or
informal agreement ... should be broken." The Porter Report makes some
very concrete proposals designed to prevent collusion in respect of banking,
and we would note that we find no similar recommendations in The Report,
that would be designed to lend credence and effectiveness to a competition
policy in respect of Mutual Funds. The Porter Report recommends "that all
agreements among banking institutions affecting the terms and conditions of
borrowing or lending be prohibited unless specifically approved by the Minister
of Finance." And "agreements relating to banking procedures and charges
for routine services" would have to be filed with the Inspector General, and
he would bring to the Minister's attention instances where they are against
the public interest. "The legislation should thus grant the Minister power to
hold inquiries, to issue stop orders and to take such other action as may be
necessary to prevent undesirable agreements."' 5 4 Thus, at the very least, a
serious attempt to create a framework of competition through legislative prescription and administrative action. The ultimate effect of the Report A
'competition' proposal is that the mutual funds will be permitted to operate in
an environment where there is no effective competition, nor a government
regulatory apparatus to control sales charges and management fees.
It should be remembered that Report A's projection of an era of competition between funds which will be striving to attract the attention of the
well informed investor exposes The Report to a degree of internal inconsistency with reference to its rationale for a high level of sales charges.
Report A stresses the importance of sales charges, as enabling the salesman
to devote ample time to a customer' 55 and indeed the sales force is said to
The Report, supra note 1, at 346, 347.
Competition Act, Bill C-256, 1971, ss. 32-36 for provisions regarding
mergers and interlocking directorates.
54
Supra, note 5, at 370.
155 The Report, supra note 1, at 322.
152
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contribute to the welfare of individual investors by expanding the public
interest in equities. 156
In terms of Report A's framework, once various measures have been
taken to educate the public in the technique of choosing mutual funds, and
the ranks of the ill-informed investors reduced to a small minority, the need
for and the role of the salesman will become severely restricted. The justifications of the salesman's role and his high cost to the purchaser, will no longer
obtain. The approach of Report B suggests an awareness of this possible
result when it discusses the view that high sales charges justify the time and
effort required to persuade an obstinate person who lacks financial knowledge, that a mutual fund investment would be appropriate for him. Report
B questions the need for high sales charges which may be rationalized only
by such marginal sales activity. But, instead of arriving at the conclusions
which follow from its premises, it veers
back into the path of the 'competition'
argument formulated by Report A.157
It cannot be over-emphasized that the functioning of an effective competition, with a well-informed public, assumes a sales force capable of raising
the level of public discourse about mutual funds. In this regard, The Report
lacks internal consistency too, because, as we shall see below, The Report
takes no significant initiative in raising the selection and training standards of
salesman, and in fact, makes recommendations which would tend to lower the
standard of salesmanship.
It would be helpful at this point to refer to the views of a prominent
American expert in economics and the capital markets, as to the nature of
competition in the mutual fund field.
Professor Edward Herman, of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, one of the authors of The Wharton Study of Mutual Funds, in his
statement delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee studying the S.E.C.
proposals for amending the Investment Company Act, 1940, focuses especially on the competition aspect. He finds that competition has not worked
in the determination of management fees and sales charges, and to the
extent that it has worked, it has been "perverse" competition. He suggests
that competition would not work effectively even with a "drastic structural
reorganization of the industry."'158 He regards the S.E.C. legislative proposals,
which can be briefly summarized as setting a 50/b maximum on sales charges,
and setting up a standard of "reasonableness" for management fees to be
tested judicially, as being a conservative compromise between doing nothing
and effecting radical changes in the industry structure. We should take note
of the fact that when Professor Herman finds a vacuum of competition, he
is speaking in the context of an American mutual fund industry, which includes a multitude of different types of funds, a mature 'no-load' industry,
and well-developed publicity through the medium of sophisticated journals
and publications. In other words, many of the conditions that Report A
suggests for the implementation of competition in the Canadian industry,
156 Id.at 511.
.57Id. at 327.
5
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already exist in the United States, with the significant exception of the existence of Retail Price Maintenance by statutory sanction. 159
Professor Herman suggests two basic reasons for the absence of competition in the mutual fund industry. Firstly, it may be attributed to the system
of organization of the mutual fund, with an "external manager and the absence of arm's length bargaining." The second reason is based on an analysis
of the buyer's side of the market, in the sense that the market is uniformed;
and is very much at the mercy of the salesman. This is borne out by the fact
that mutual funds are "sold" and not "bought".60° The very fact that mutual
funds have to be "sold" indicates that we are here dealing with an uninformed
market, and this has been borne out by The Wharton Study which found a
"lack of correlation between mutual fund sales and performance." "If there
were an informed market, you would expect mutual fund sales to be highly
related to performance of funds. It is not. In our mutual fund study, (Wharton Study) which covered a multiyear period, we found a very weak link
between sales and performance, but a very strong link between sales charge
and sales." 016 Consequently, we have an upside-down competition where sales
are increased by raising sales charges and adding to the sales force. The
mutual funds, contends Professor Herman, do not compete through performance or the services they offer to consumers, but by gaining the favour of the
dealers by offering higher sales charges, and through the medium of reciprocal
brokerage. However, competitive markets should operate in terms of the selling of a quality product, on its merits, instead of training salesmen to sell a
product without regard for its fundamental merit.162 The competition is thus
'perverse' in the sense that the salesman's or dealer's commission plays a
more decisive role than the merit of the fund.
Herman decries the argument of those who claim that the mutual fund
industry is competitive by virtue of the large number of funds currently
operating. The emphasis, instead, should be placed on the importance of
personal selling. When the buyer is confronted by the salesman, he is being
offered one fund, and the fact that there may be 350 others is "quite irrelevant to the contracting process involved in personal selling, which often
approximates what economists call a bilateral monopoly, with an imbalance in
bargaining power between the skilled salesman, who knows what he is doing,
and the relatively uninformed buyer."'16 3
The response offered by Report A would be to the effect that the solution
for the uninformed investor is effective disclosure. Professor Herman avers,
however, that the securities industry is already characterized by extensive
disclosure, and he doubts that disclosure can achieve the type of objective,
for example, that Report A sets out. Since materials, such as prospectuses,
provide only the facts about a single fund, one cannot compare funds, and
comparative disclosure would be very difficult to achieve.' M This is a realistic
approach, because it is unlikely that a mutual fund would provide compara150 Investment Company Act, 1940, s. 22(d).
1

00 Supra, note 158.
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five figures that would do anything other than show up that particular fund
to its best advantage, and this type of disclosure would not truly inform the
uninformed.
REPORT A: COMPETITION AND MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
Since Report A places the burden of its solution on the merits of competition, one might believe that the essence of its proposal would be a system
wherein competition is based on the fund's performance record, which,
according to Professor Herman, would represent competition on merit. However, a careful examination of Report A, will indicate that a recurring theme
is the playing down of assessments based on actual performance records of the
funds. One may take a position as to whether past performance is an adequate
guide to the prediction of future rate of return. However, it is difficult to
contemplate a theory relying on competition, which pleads agnosticism as to
the means of determining the quality of investment management. Since the
very essence of the mutual fund is the pooling of money to pay for and obtain
the best in professional management, one would infer from this that a prime
consideration in a postulate of a competitive market, would be that aspect of
the mutual fund which represents its very essence. As long as Report A plays
down this aspect, the concept of informing investors, and developing competition becomes a mere receptacle, devoid of content and meaning.
Report A says, "In spite of its importance, quality of investment management is difficult to measure and may be impossible to predict."'1 5 The Report
rightly stresses the importance of relating a rate of return analysis of a fund,
with the degree of risk it assumes. The Report, referring to an Analysis of
Canadian Mutual Funds Based on Historical Rate of Return and Risk,106
states the following as the conclusions to be derived from this analysis.
"Mutual funds with a high rate of return over one five year period tend to
show a high rate of return over the following five year period, but the correlation is very weak..." The Report concludes that this would indicate that
historical records of rate of return do not provide a good basis for prediction
of future rate of return. Historical records however, do provide a good basis
for predicting future risk. Tests combining 'risk and 'rate of return' "indicated
a low level of predictability. This result casts doubt on the value of historical
information in the prediction of the relative ranking of mutual funds on the
basis of combined risk and rate of return."' 67 This suggests, very simply, that
one cannot measure the quality of investment management by referring to
past performance.
When Report A proceeds to discuss means of fostering competition by
educating investors, it refers to the information that the various communications media would present, in order to enable the investor to compare the
mutual funds. Report A would prefer that this information be essentially
management fees and sales charges, but with no great emphasis placed on performance. The conclusion outlined in the above paragraph would apparently
164 Id. at 728.
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constitute the rationale for de-emphasizing past performance or any attempt
to assess the quality of management. Report A says, "In paragraphs 3.08 and
3.16 we criticize the present practice of such newspapers in ranking mutual
funds by rate of return over comparatively short periods. Analyses should be
prepared which take other factors into account, including investment objectives, sales charges, and management fees."' 6 8
The same tendency to obscure considerations of investment performance
may be found in the recommendation of Report A to prohibit incentive management fees. 169 It appears contradictory for a Report, which wishes to rely
on the free play of competitive forces to avert government intervention, to, at
the same time, recommend a blanket prohibition of incentive fees. One of The
Report's contentions is that the incentive fee, whereby the investment manager's fee is raised up to a certain maximum for performance superior to a
specified index, and lowered down to a specified minimum for relatively
poorer performance, is not at all necessary. This is because he is already
rewarded for excellent performance because the consequent increase in assets
will, in turn, increase the dollar value of the management fee. Report A then
adds, "A less direct, but perhaps more important, relationship is that good
performance ordinarily results in a higher volume of sales, thereby increasing
total net assets and with it the management fee.' 170 This proposition is somewhat doubtful, in view of the fact that growth in sales has been found to be
more closely 71
related to the level of the sales charge than to the record of
performance.
The Report finds serious problems inherent in an incentive management
fee, such as that it will encourage an investment manager to take unnecessary
risks with the mutual fund portfolio, in order to maximize the fee. It suggests
a partial answer in the inclusion of a penalty provision in the event that the
performance is below par. But, to use The Report's own logic, in the case of
a fixed percentage management fee, the same problem exists, on the basis of
the contention that good performance will increase management fees through
increased sales. The Report cannot expect to employ both sides of the
argument.
The Report deals with some of the serious technical problems involved in
setting up an incentive fee clause that will be fair to the investor. These
should, however, point the way towards regulation in place of total prohibition.
Report A places its faith in competition as a regulator of industry
practices, but believes such competition ought to be fostered primarily in the
area of sales charges and management fees, with a playing down of actual
performance or rate of return. It is important, for a proper understanding
of Report A to view the two emphases together, that is, competition and the
insignificance of adtual performance. These two emphases are contradictory.
Competition, predicated on the basis of rate of return, represents to many
small funds the only hope of competing with the large funds. The ability to sell
Id.at 329.
160 Id. at 398-406.
0
17 Id. at 399.
171 Cf. supra, p. 642.
108
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performance, and the possibility of gaining from an equitable incentive fee,
provide the framework for some degree of ease of entry. Armon Glenn,
quotes the manager of a new small American fund, who complains that it is
difficult to compete with the large established funds in getting clients:
There's a real Establishment in the industry today-it's like trying to break into
an exclusive club. A management company can sit on a half billion dollars and
have no performance at all. But it's got the customers sewed up with contractual
plans and brokers pushing the shares. It can make good money on a
9/z fee.
I'd go broke.1 72

He wants the incentive fee, because he must accomplish through merit, what
the larger funds achieve through high-pressure salesmanship. Henry Neuwirth,
president of Neuwirth Management & Research Corp., said,
The only way a new fund can break into the business is through the gamble of
a performance fee to be earned. This is also needed to attract capable management ... 173

With the incentive fee, the small fund acquires the capacity to attract topflight security analysts, giving it a hope of competing with the larger fund.
Thus, instead of blanket prohibition of the incentive fee, it would be
preferable to regulate it so as to eliminate or at least vitiate possible abuses.
For example, it would be most important to require that the incentive fee
basis include a clause providing for an equivalent penalty to be paid by the
fund, with a floor for the basic fee, and a ceiling for the top incentive fee.
The result would be a sliding scale fee predicated on performance.
It should be noted that the incentive fee funds in the U.S. profited by the
arrangement in 1968, but, generally, paid very heavy penalty fees for their
poorer performance in 1969. For example, a well known mutual fund
manager paid a penalty to the fund of $105,000 for the August fiscal year,
while another paid $708,693 for its poor 1969 showing. 1'7 4
Quirin and Waters, as opposed to Report A, conclude that the incentive
fee should not be prohibited. 175
In averting serious consideration of competition on the basis of rate of
return, Report A avoids the Scylla of encouraging the investor to focus on the
acid-test, the performance record of the fund, but then, runs aground on the
Charybdis of justification for the very concept of a mutual fund together with
the management fee. Report A assumes that it is not feasible to assess management in terms of predicting the rate of return of a fund, based on past
performance, as an indication of the fund manager's investment ability. It
apparently follows from this, that management really makes no significant
difference. Thus, the 'random-walk' theory that an unmanaged diversified
portfolio will do as well as, if not better than a managed portfolio of stocks
with similar risk factors. Professors Renshaw and Feldstein say, speaking of
investment portfolio performance:
Evidence that can be cited, indicates that the average return from professional
172 Heads We Win ... : Performance-FeeMutual Funds Have Had Their Ups and
Downs, Barron's, March 2, 1970, at 5.
173

Id.

1-4 Id. at 5, 12.
175 The Study, supra note 10, paper 1, at 12, 13.
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advice and continued supervision is very low. In many cases it is zero or negative;
in other words, investment companies as a whole have not outperformed repre176
sentative stock averages which could form the basis of an 'unmanaged' portfolio

Professors Renshaw and Feldstein do not deny that some mutual funds have
outperformed 'unmanaged' funds, but "these companies (the better performers) in the main have been offset by other companies which have performed less well than the major averages. '177 This would tend to bear out the
argument in favour of permitting incentive fees. Let those who do perform the
service promised to the investor, as opposed to those who do not, be compensated accordingly, and let the light of publicity shine on those who perform a significant management service, as opposed to the many who do not.
Henry C. Wallich, Professor of Economics at Yale University, in a
statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee considering mutual fund
legislation, advocated a modified version of the 'random-walk' theory of
stock price movements, and this led him to seriously question whether the
mutual fund management companies were indeed earning their fee altogether,
let alone the generous fees on the order of 90/o. According to the 'randomwalk' theory, the market price of the stock has already discounted everything
that is already known, and the future price movement is unpredictable.
Professor Wallich explains that:
according to this theory of complete discounting of all that is known, and
subject to the respective probabilities, neither research into the company, nor the
one to predict
industry, nor the whole economy, nor chart reading, would enable
178
the next move, or any thereafter, better than a random guess.
...

Professor Wallich says that studies by noted professors, including a Ph.D.
dissertation, "have all shown that mutual funds on average do not do better
and usually do worse than random selection."'1 79 He concludes that the results
of the investment advice of mutual fund management companies, not unlike
all other investment advice, "are unlikely to do better than random choice,
its value therefore very low or zero." Consequently, it is not meaningful to
compare the level of mutual fund advisory fees with other fees. Instead, one
should ask how far these fees are economically justifiable. 8 09 Thus, the quality
170 The Case For an Unmanaged Investment Company, Readings in Financial
Analysis and Investment Management (E. Lerner, ed. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.

Irwin, Inc., 1963) 487-89.

177 Id. at 490.
17 8 Supra, note 99, Senate Committee Print, at 1059, 1061.
10 Id. I. Friend, M. Blume, I. Crockett, Mutual Funds And Other

Institutional

Investors (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970) is a follow-up to The Wharton Study, supra
note 30, and its findings reinforce the 'Wharton' conclusions, while tending to support
the general argument in this essay.
Mutual Funds And Other Institutional Investors at 21 summarizes some of its
findings:
When funds were classified by fund size, sales charges, management expenses,
portfolio turnover, and investment objectives, no consistent relationship was found
between these facts and investment performance properly adjusted for risk. To
the extent that a relationship exists between performance and sales charges, the
funds with the lowest charges, including the 'no-load' funds, appear to perform
slightly better than the others .... In 1968-69, high management expenses and,

to a lesser extent, high turnover seemed to be linked with poor investment per-

formance.
18 OSupra, note 99, Senate Committee Print, at 1062.
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of investment advice offered does not justify the current level of fees charged.
Professor Wallich does say that there are a few security analysts of extraordinary ability,
but, "The average institution is unlikely to have them on
1
its staff."''
Is this the position taken by Report A? A positive answer to this question
is doubtful in view of Report A's reluctance to control management fees. The
Report cannot have it both ways. It cannot implicitly place a premium on the
value of mutual fund investment management to the extent that fees for such
valuable services may not be limited by regulation and at the same time,
disparage a system whereby investors are encouraged to examine whether this
service is indeed of value or not, in the form of an assessment of actual performance results.
MANAGEMENT FEES AND SALES CHARGES:
AN INTERIM SOLUTION
Report A concedes to Report B the interim solution for the control of
management fees and sales charges, to last for five years approximately, and
to be relinquished with the advent of a competitive milieu, even if that is
prior to the end of the five year period. 1832 In essence, Report B would grant
the securities administrator the discretionary authority to set the fees when
the mutual fund is registered with the Securities Commission, or to deny
authorization in the event of an application for a higher level of fees. The
securities administrator would also have the authority to challenge an existing
fee structure, and would consider the management fee and sales charge
together. This would allow for flexibility in fee setting, with the administrator
being able to make distinctions between various types of funds and their
relevant costs, and would make for a management and sales fee arrived at
through the process of negotiation between the mutual fund and the securities
administrator. The proposal would grant the mutual fund the right to appeal
a decision of the securities administrator to a Court, which would have the
power not to set the fee, but to rule whether the fee that was fixed by the
administrator was reasonable or not, and if not, it would in effect, be sent
back to the securities administrator for revision, that is, to be scaled down.
The Court would be guided by appropriate
legislative guidelines, some of
83
which are suggested in The Report.
The Report states that, "comparatively few judicial applications will in
fact be necessary, for the initial applications will result in decisions that will
constitute adequate precedents for subsequent use."'1 If that is the case,
then why the reluctance to establish a legislative standard at the outset? Since
management fees and sales charges will, in effect, be set by well known
judicial precedents, where is the much vaunted flexibility which The Report
assumes will result from negotiations to be carried on between the mutual
fund and the securities administrator?
1s Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969, Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, at 146.
.82 The Report, supra note 1, at 348-360.
183 Id. at 354-356.
1 4
8 M
d. at 354.
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Furthermore, in the event that it is achieved, the very flexibility that The
Report wishes to introduce, by permitting different treatment for different
types of funds, could result in discriminatory treatment of some funds, in the
event of an uneven or unequivalent application of the Security Commission's
discretionary power.
It may be suggested, that Report A, in allowing Report B to propose
this interim solution, was merely granting it a hollow rhetorical victory. While
the securities administrator may challenge the level of sales charges and management fees of a mutual fund which is already registered, it is doubtful that
a Securities Commission would take the initiative in attempting to lower the
rates. In effect, the proposal leaves us with the current rates, which appear to
be excessive, and provides no assurance that the securities administrator will
not approve increased fees. Of course, the Securities Commission could initiate
a lower fee structure for the industry, by refusing to accept a prospectus unless
it includes a reduction in fees. This is a possibility in view of the fact that a
new prospectus must be filed after the expiration of a one year period, because the shares of mutual funds are offered continuously.t1 But whether a
'Securities Commission would thus intervene is open to some doubt. One may
assume that, given the effectiveness of the mutual fund lobby, and the weakness of the representation of the shareholders' or "peoples'" interests, a
Securities Commission might tend to approve higher sales charges and management fees.
Report B itself indicates that this interim solution differs from the U.S.
SEC position, in that the former leaves no room for a shareholder of a mutual
fund to challenge the management fee, whereas the latter is predicated on permitting the shareholder to go to court to challenge the reasonableness of the
management fee. 186 Serious consideration ought to be given to a solution
somewhat closer to the SEC proposals, with the 5% flat limitation on sales
charges generally, and the statement of a legislative standard of reasonablewith
ness, designed to allow shareholders, as well as the SEC, or shareholders
187
the assistance of the SEC, to challenge the management fee.
Another alternative is based on strengthening the interim solution proposed by Report B, so that it will function fairly and equitably. The investor
protection aspect of this proposal would be enhanced with the introduction
of the adversary system in the rate-making decisional process. Thus, the
decision as to management fees and sales charges would be made within the
framework of public hearings, held by the Securities Commission, with the
right of representation on behalf of shareholders of the mutual fund whose
185 J. P. Williamson, Mutual Funds, Studies In Canadian Company Law, (J. Zeigel,
ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 461.
188 The Report, supra note 1, at 353.
187 Supra, note 181; supra, note 33, House Committee Print at 30, 45. The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-547) represents an attenuated
version of the SEC proposals. Among its major provisions, a mutual fund investment
adviser is given a specific fiduciary duty, with the consequence that the SEC or a shareholder could bring an action to test whether the management fee is appropriate. And
the Act provides that the National Association of Securities Dealers will regulate the

level of sales charges, a form of self-regulation.
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rates are being evaluated. The shareholders would be given standing before
the securities tribunal, and could choose to be represented by counsel. The
problem, however, remains, as to the ability of a shareholder group to finance
counsel in order that their case be adequately presented to the tribunal,
especially in view of the fact that the mutual fund would be drawing on the
proceeds of the management fee to engage counsel. It would be helpful if provision were made for the mutual fund management company to pay reasonable
costs for 'shareholders' counsel. Even if the latter could not be effected, the
proposal itself would achieve a number of important objectives. It would move
the decisional process from the 'back-room' into the public realm, where the
'interested' public could learn about the contentions being made on both sides
of the issue. An administrative decision and a record of public hearings could
be consulted. Furthermore, unless the mutual fund management company had
a very strong case for an increase in fees, it would be reluctant to extend itself
by initiating public hearings, with the attendant publicity and focus on the
management fees and sales charges. The mutual fund management companies
are reluctant to create a situation whereby public attention is focused on the
management fees. The Report explains that the management companies have
not raised their fees up to the currently permissible level, because "the necessity to notify shareholders and unit-holders of the increase would draw mana88
gement fees to their attention as an important aspect of their operations."'
In sum, this proposal would afford an opportunity to the shareholders to make
their views known to the Securities Commission.
In order to avoid a multiplicity of hearings, some provision might be
made, whereby, under certain circumstances, where adequate precedent has
been established in public hearings, and other specified conditions precedent
exist, that the Securities Commission would exercise a well-defined power to
make a decision in the absence of public hearings. Perhaps, in that event, the
Securities Commission would give public notice to that effect, and invite
shareholders to submit briefs. However, if not properly administered, this
proviso could mitigate the effectiveness of the entire proposal.
The right of the mutual fund to appeal an adverse decision appears to
be a one-sided right. While the mutual fund can appeal, the opposing party,
the shareholder, is given no standing to intervene before the Court. What is
the right of the shareholders if they believe that the Securities Commission
decision is against their interest?
Provision should therefore be made that when a Securities Commission
passes on mutual fund management fees and sales charges, and the mutual
fund management company reserves the right of appeal, it should be required
to set aside a reasonable sum of money to allow for retention of counsel on
behalf of the shareholders of that fund, so that they may appeal a decision
which they view as being adverse to their interests, or so that they may use
their standing before the court to oppose the mutual fund in the event that it
decides to appeal the Securities Commission decision. Thus, all the interested
parties, including the shareholders, will have an opportunity to present their
89
views.1
188 The Report, supra note 1, at 321.
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REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUND SALESMEN
Report A emerges, with full force in the area of the regulation of salesmen, while Report B remains relatively quiescent in this area. Report A states
the assumption at the outset, which will justify its attenuation of the present
regulatory structure. The Report does not hesitate to concede that, "the
scheme we propose, considered in its totality, would be less restrictive than
the one presently in effect." This policy is based on the following premises.
"In a free economy sales forces should be allowed to function unless some
valid public policy motive is found for their abolition. We are aware of no
such public policy motive."' °0 There is some measure of obscurity in this
statement, because the issue appears to be regulation instead of abolition of
sales forces, the latter not constituting a serious suggestion. However, The
Report appears to be saying that, in its view, interference with the free function of the salesman, is akin to abolition.
It appears that when we are confronted with a need to intervene in
order to protect the investor, The Report invokes the free economy concept
whereas, when the question is one of protecting the interests of the mutual
fund industry, such as penalizing a short-term trade in a mutual fund for
over $50,000,101 or absolute prohibition of incentive fees, 192 then Report A
overcomes its reticence about interfering with the free economy!
There is indeed a very clear public policy motive for regulating mutual
fund sales forces. Mutual funds call on peoples' savings and retirement funds,
and, as The Report indicates, are a long-term commitment, 0 3 and are thus
imbued with a special public interest. This is recognized in the concluding
paragraph of the first section of the U.S. Investment Company Act, 1940,
which speaks of eliminating conditions "which adversely affect the national
public interest and the interest of investors.' The investor must be protected
from glib and high-pressure salesmanship. For example, the type of salesman
who sells mutual fund shares by means of the technique indicated in the
following letter from an investor, should either not have been selected for the
position, or should have been more adequately trained to fulfill his responsibility to edify instead of looking only to the earning of a commission.
I am in a mutual fund called 'X' which is now $5.51 a share ($8.39 a year ago).
I bought the stock on the suggestion of a salesman through a bank with the
shares as security for a loan. Now, with prices down, the bank wants more
collateral for the loan which I must supply or else sell the shares. What should
I do?'94

The mutual fund salesman encouraged his client to engage in a reckless, costly
speculative venture entirely inappropriate in a mutual fund context. The sales
189 1 owe the suggestions as to the Securities Commission Public Hearing proposal,
and the granting of standing to the fund shareholders before an appeal court, in the
event that the mutual fund reserves the right of appeal to Professor William A. W.
Neilson, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Downsview, Ontario. Any
inadequacies in the definition of the proposals are my own.
100 The Report, supra note 1, at 511.
101 Id. at 492.
192 Id. at 398-406.
103 Id.at 492.
104 Ray Magladry, Borrowing Money to Buy Mutual is a Poor Investment, Toronto
Daily Star, January 2, 1970 at 12. 'X' represents the name of the fund.
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charge for the 'X' Fund is 9% and bank loans are generally in the area of
10%, which means that the fund share would have to rise 19% in value in
order for the investor merely to break even!
The PorterReport recognized the problem in the low standard of selection and admission of mutual fund salesmen into the industry, as well as in
the lack of adequate training:
Many mutual fund salesmen have had no experience in the securities industry,
are working part time only, and are poorly-trained; moreover, the high rate of
turnover of these salesmen has provided a chronic problem for the hard pressed
securities administrators. One commission reported to us that the doubling of
salesmen's registrations in the two years ending in 1961 was due almost entirely
to the heavy influx of mutual fund salesmen.195

The Report would, in essence, move away from an emphasis on the
selection and training process, to a system of control via "internal procedures
established by the sales organization for the supervision of salesmen."'0 8 This

is a form of dependence on industry self-regulation, which would tend to be
inadequate, because of the degree of self-interest in maintaining a high-level
of sales on the part of the sales organization, and a reluctance to undertake
measures which would have the effect of reducing sales. Another problem is
that this solution creates a facade of regulation, when in fact, there is no
viable and enforceable system of regulation in operation.
In Ontario, newly registered mutual fund salesmen are required to take
the Canadian Mutual Funds course, sponsored by the Canadian Mutual
Funds Association. 197 Report A has reviewed the course, and has "concluded
that, while far from an intensive analysis of the industry, it is adequate for
the purpose."' 198 This conclusion is open to question. It should be noted that
the Canadian Mutual Funds Association is an association of mutual funds,
and it is in the interest of the members of the CMFA that a large number of
salesmen are qualified by the examination, because they are their principle
instrumentalities for earning a profit. It should be appreciated that the CMFA
represents only certain mutual funds, namely those funds which are sold
subject to a basic sales charge which exceeds 8%. The CMFA membership
consists of only 41 of the 136 mutual funds qualified for sale in Canada; and
most of the 41 funds are distributed "primarily or exclusively through direct
sales forces."' 99 The latter, especially, would indicate the pressure which the
195 Supra, note 5 at 353.
1906
The Report, supra note 1, at 510. The Report recognizes and deals with the
problems of self-regulation, at 724, 725.
197 Id.at 514.
19
81d. at 515.
199 Id. at 727, 728. The data in the text as to the CMFA is current as of the date
The Report was issued. Cf. CMFA adopts major rule changes, The Globe and Mail, Report On Business, May 23, 1970, at 2, in respect of changes in the CMFA constitution,
by-laws, code of ethics and regulations, designed to attempt to implement some of The
Report's recommendations; among them, that the CMFA become a more representative
organization. Cf. CMFA takes giant strides, hesitates on other big issues, The
Globe and Mail, Report on Business, May 29, 1970, for a contention that the changes
then adopted by the CMFA were among the simplest of those recommended by The
Report.
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member mutual fund would place on the CMFA that a sufficient number of
salesmen be qualified. In this light, it is difficult to understand how Report A
could assess the adequacy of the CMFA course and examination, when it fails
to indicate that it received information from the CMFA as to the failure or
rejection rate of those enrolled in the course and taking the examination.
The CMFA course is comprised of four units of programmed materials:
Unit I-An Introduction To Mutual Funds;
Unit fl-The Fundamentals of Investment;
Unit I-How Mutual Funds Operate;
Unit IV-The Services Of Mutual Funds.
The material is very elementary and demands little of the sales candidate.
Furthermore, the emphasis appears to be centred on developing sales techniques and giving the salesman just enough knowledge about mutual funds to
enable him to employ high-pressure sales techniques, such as playing on the
fear of inflation, and warning people that their 'dollar' savings will have
turned to 'nought' when retirement age is reached. An examination of the
course materials will reveal that they fail to place sufficient emphasis on the
attainment of a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of various investments, which could enable salesmen to place mutual funds in their proper
context, and to understand the underlying ingredient df mutual funds, namely
shares of stock; and most certainly not enough to qualify salesmen to hold
themselves out to the public as 'financial planners'.
Perhaps the philosophy of the CMFA with regard to its training program, is best summarized by its submission to The Report, where it said,
"A salesman does not need to be an amateur investment analyst-he has
only to know what his product is and how it can be used. '200 There is reason
to believe that the industry or the sales organization would prefer a salesman
who knows very little about investment analysis, so that he will not be burdened by the 'facts' in his sales talk, nor inhibited by considerations of prudent investment policy in his recommendations. 20 1 Allan Conwill, Director of
the Division of Corporate Regulations, SEC, said that a mutual fund executive
told him 'that he will not hire a salesman who has any knowledge of the securities business because it will divert him from a proper sales approach."
Conwill comments wryly,
"Apparently even a lot of securities knowledge is
20 2
a dangerous thing."
There is every reason to believe that a comprehensive background in
understanding securities, as such, is critical in gaining an understanding of
mutual funds, for mutual funds are nothing less than securities packaged in
a certain way in the context of a particular portfolio.
200 The Report, supra note 1, at 510.
201 Such as recommending 'front-end load' or contractual plans, which, as we have
attempted to indicate supra, pp. 615-619, are suitable for no one, except for the salesman,
who receives his commission in advance, for the 'uninvested' portion of the fund sale.
202 The Minority Menace To Mutual Fund Selling (1963), 18 The Business Lawyer,

1055, 1056.

1971]

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

The Report indicates that one may be qualified to sell mutual funds, if
he will "pass the Canadian Securities Course, a more extensive and difficult
course designed for those who propose to participate in a general brokerage
business.1 203 It is reasonable to expect that the mutual fund salesman who
frequently deals with those who are less sophisticated than the individual who
has the ability to manage his own portfolio, should be expected to conform to
as high a standard as the stock broker, or registered representative. Gopman
has stated his belief, which he indicates to be partially proved by the SEC's
Policy Report, "that those who invest in investment companies are
financially
'20 4
less sophisticated than those who use other investment media.
The Report rightly questions the fact that a sales candidate is presently
permitted to commence selling immediately upon passing a very easy preliminary examination, and has a period of up to a year during which he is
permitted to sell mutual funds prior to passing the final examination. The
Report would reduce this period, but still allow an interim period of 3 months
of selling prior to full qualification, in the case of a full time salesman. The
reasoning is that he be permitted to sell fund shares for 3 months, instead of
having to wait till he is fully 'qualified', because he requires the income to
support himself.
The Report says, "It would be necessary for the applicant to be supported while he was engaged in his studies, and the addition of the expense
which this would require to that already necessary for registration fees and
the costs of the Canadian Mutual Funds Course might well raise to an
uneconomic level the initial financial burden involved in becoming a salesman." It appears that The Report has found that mutual fund sales organizations do not compensate salesmen during the interim period prior to full
registration, and that they do not even pay some of the basic fees incidental
to full registration, and that they should not be expected to do so. Thus, the
initial registration period, for at least 3 months prior to taking the examination
during which time the salesman is permitted to sell fund shares, will be retained.20 5 In disposing of the issue of registration to sell prior to full qualification in this manner, The Report has missed an important opportunity to
recommend a significant reform, as will be suggested below.
There is considerably more need for reform in the qualification of sales
personnel than The Report would concede. Report B is permitted to briefly
assert itself, when it stresses that the sales organizations should strive to
exclude the salesmen "who will remain for only a short period." Report B
continues:
These salesmen tend to effect sales only to their family and friends before realizing that they are not qualified to continue as salesmen. They lack the feeling of
long-term commitment which is so essential for all participants in the securities
203 The Report, supra note 1, at 514.
204 Regulation of Mutual Fund Selling Practices (1969), 24 The Business Lawyer,
409, 419.
205 The Report, supra note 1, at 516. OSC-Policy #3-06, Examination Program For
Salesman, April 5, 1971
(2) Salesmen applying for registration to sell mutual funds exclusively must
complete the mutual fund course and pass the final examination within three
months of being granted probationary registration.
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industry. They do not provide adequate continuing service for their clients, and
they often do not receive adequate training and experience.2 06

This represents merely another rhetorical triumph for Report B, for Report
A concludes that applicants for registration as salesmen should not "be
required to satisfy
any preconditions in addition to taking and passing the
207
training course."
We suggest that a comprehensive statement regarding standards for the
acceptability of a candidate for registration as a mutual fund salesman should
be incorporated either in a policy statement issued by the Securities Commission, or adopted by an effective self-regulatory body; and that it should
be along the lines of the following statement in the New York Stock Exchange
Rules with reference to Registered Representatives:
2345.15: Acceptability. - In determining a candidates acceptability for registration the Exchange looks for evidence of:
(1) The integrity of the candidate and his record of high standards of business
conduct, as shown in the investigations and observations of his member firm
employer, previous employers, educational institutions attended, etc.
(2) His potential ability to perform creditably the duties of a registered representative, as shown by an employment period of specific training for these duties in
a member firm office or equivalent other experience in the securities business.
(3) His preparation in the areas of knowledge necessary for a registered representative as demonstrated in an Exchange examination.

The following section deals with the requirement that the training period be
for a duration of six months. During this period he is to be engaged in formal
study, and is not to solicit business. Under 2435.17 of the NYSE rules the
Registered Representative's agreement is set out whereby he undertakes to
comport himself according to the Exchange standards, such as subjecting
himself to Exchange discipline, if he has been guilty of, for example, conduct
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.
Section 2435.15 (1) is effectively implemented:
2435.19: Investigations and Records - Members and member organizations
should make a thorough inquiry into the previous record and reputation of
persons they contemplate employing.
The background and reputation check should whenever possible include at least
personal conversation with all employers during the previous three years and
verification before or promptly after employment of business history for the
previous 10 years ...
In the case of proposed registered representatives, the Exchange makes the
10-year verification check as a service to member firms, but 2 the
check of
08
employers during the last 3 years is a member firm responsibility.

The Toronto Stock Exchange does not have a similarly elaborate set of
standards for registered representatives. However, sec. 8.35 of the TSE Bylaws provides:
All Approved Persons and employees of members shall comply with the Exchange
Requirements. Each member shall ensure that all his employees, directors and
officers, and all the partners in the member firm comply with Exchange require-

ments.
200

The Report, supra note 1, at 517.
7 Supra, note 205.
208 NYSE Constitution and Rules, 1968, CCH.
20
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This then serves to bring the registered representative under the very strict
disciplinary provisions of sec. 17.10, which speaks of "contravening any
Exchange Requirements" or being
"guilty of any conduct proceeding or method of business which the Board in its
absolute discretion deems unbecoming a member or Approved Person, or incon-

sistent with just and equitable principles of trade, or detrimental to the interest of
209
the Exchange or the public: ...-

These are models for a statement of prerequisites for employment, and
standards of conduct which any provision for the regulation of mutual fund
sales personnel should look to, whether, through the medium of effective selfregulation, or by means of the Securities Commission itself. Anything less than
such a standard, which would call for provisions for effective enforcement,
0
that is, through disciplinary action, would be a disservice to the public. 21
Furthermore, the six month training period without authorization to sell
securities, in the NYSE regulations, has a great deal of merit. It has impelled
many stock brokerage firms to pay the trainee a salary during this period.
Against this background, it is surprising that The Report, in allowing
the full time salesman to be registered to sell during the three months preceding full qualification, does so to enable the candidate to support himself
during the interim period. The Report fails to consider the alternative that
the three month interim period be eliminated under the assumption that the
sales organization would undertake to fulfill its obligation to the salesman by
supporting him during this period. We suggest that this would be a positive
result.
It is not merely that, by right, the burden of supporting the salesman for
a time, ought to be borne by the sales organization. Firstly, during this
interim period, the aspiring salesman should be viewed as a bona fide 'trainee'
and ought to devote his efforts to the learning process instead of to the solicitation of sales. Ifindeed this duration of time, whether 3 months or 6 months,
is not required in order to prepare the salesman for the CMFA examination,
then our suspicions are again confirmed, to the effect that the examination
lacks the requisite degree of intensity. To reach this objective, of making the
interim period a true 'training' period, the CMFA examination should be made
more rigorous so that the sales candidate will be compelled to engage in
studying instead of in selling. It is suggested that the period of training for
full time salesmen be extended for six months, without the candidate being
registered for selling, and that the sales organizations be encouraged to provide the candidate with adequate support during this period.
This would achieve a second purpose, in that there is a positive value
in having a sales organization make an 'investment' in a salesman. Once the
hiring of a salesman entails an expenditure, in the absence of immediate sales
209

TSE By-Laws, December 1969.

210 The Report, supra note 1, makes no specific recommendations as to a code of

conduct for salesmen and for admission standards, and even appears to deny the need
for a code and for such standards, Cf. supra, p. 116. If, however, The Report, at 731,
No. 2 re conditions for a self-regulatory organization, assumes that the self-regulatory
organization will be responsible for a code and admission standards, this should be
articulated.
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production, the sales organization will tend to select its salesmen with a view
to a long-term commitment. Report B suggests this as an objective, but
Report A fails to offer any proposals designed to achieve it. The U.S. Special
Study reports that mutual fund salesmen have the highest rate of turnover in
the securities business. 211 The training period proposal is one way to cope
with the problem. There is reason to believe, presently, that the high turnover
of mutual fund salesmen, is due, in part, to the fact that it is relatively easy
and cost-free for the sales organization to hire a large number of salesmen.
However, if the sales organization were placed in the position where it
would be compelled to make a meaningful expenditure in the course of
engaging salesmen, and would be expected to establish programs designed to
offer training in something more than sales gimmickry, it would be far more
selective in its hiring procedures than is currently the case. Additional requirements relating to the provision of sales training courses should be set. This,
together with an adequate training period, lasting at least six months, during
which time the trainee would not be authorized to sell fund shares, would
compel the sales organizations to make an 'investment' in each salesman, and
they would therefore approach the 'hiring' task with a higher degree of responsibility. Thus, there is much merit in raising the level of selection and
training of mutual fund salesmen to that of registered representatives of stock
brokerage firms.
PART-TIME SALESMEN
The Report opposes any restriction on the hiring of part-time mutual
fund salesmen, on the ground that the quality of sales is dependent more on
the character of the individual, than on the amount of time he spends performing a service, and also, on the principle that this is simply a matter for
industry to determine for itself.212
Report B does assert itself as to the reasoning which is used to negative
part-time salesmen, such as, the difficulty in disciplining and the lack of
long-term commitment, but again, Report A emerges victorious. 21 3
It is interesting that this question of part-time salesmen is related to the
above discussed issues as to the compensation of salesmen during the interim
period prior to full registration. The Special Study indicates that the sales
organizations prefer to engage part-time salesmen, because they do not wish
to compensate salesmen during a 'training' period or provide them with an
advance 'draw' on commissions. The Special Study, on the basis of statistical
data, concludes that most mutual fund organizations cannot claim that even
half of their sales force works full time in the area of mutual fund sales. "In
the aggregate, the sales forces of firms specializing in the sale of mutual
211 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, Part I, at 96, 97. The material
developed by The Special Study, regarding deceptive practises of mutual fund salesmen,

should be carefully considered.
212 The Report, supra note 1, at 525.
213

Id.
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funds were shown by the STS (statistical survey; Screening, Training and
Supervision) responses to be composed of about 66 percent part-time salesmen. 2

14

The willingness on the part of Report A to encourage the hiring of parttime salesmen is consistent with its acceptance of a low standard of salesmen
selection and training, in that, it is satisfied with nothing more than a very
minimal CMFA course requirement. Given the assumption that there is no
ground or need for insisting on any serious degree of professional standards
and requirements for entry into the salesmans' position, it follows that parttime salesmen will be just as capable of carrying out the minimal tasks expected of mutual fund salesmen as will full-time salesmen.
Part-time salesmanship is inconsistent with the requisite degree of professionalism which asserts that the salesman be well-informed and capable of
educating his clients, and offering guidance on the basis of an intelligent
understanding of the best available information. The mutual fund salesman,
like the stock broker should be viewed as a full-time professional who employs
his time to educate himself, analyze the state of the securities markets, etc.
Both the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock
Exchange, require that securities
salesmen devote themselves to the securities
business on a full-time basis.2 15
Failure to apply the same standard to mutual fund salesmen as is currently applied to stock brokers, would be to lend credence to the conviction
that 'anybody' can be a mutual fund salesman, regardless of how little time
he is prepared to devote to the carrying out of the salesman's responsibilities.
A part-time salesman, we fear, will be tempted to apportion a disproportionate
amount of time to actual selling, with too little time remaining for servicing
clients' accounts, studying various 'plans', and assessing the particular fund or
fund 'plan' which is best suited to his client's needs.
CALLING ON RESIDENCES
Report A calls for the exemption of mutual fund salesmen from section
67(2) of the Ontario Securities Act, 1966, which limits the authorization of
securities salesmen to call on people at their residences to certain specified
instances, such as where the prospects are close friends or relatives, or in the
case of those who had requested in writing that information be supplied to
them regarding the security being offered for sale.
The Report suggests a number of reasons for exempting the mutual fund
salesman from the 'calling on residences' prohibition. 216 Its effect is said to
be particularly onerous on the mutual fund salesmen, because their archcompetitors, life insurance salesmen, are not subject to such a restraint.
Again, a tendency on the part of Report A, to prefer to bring mutual fund
214 Supra, note 211, Part 4, at 116.
2 15

Supra, note 208, s. 2346, Rule 346; and supra, note 209, By-Law 8.10.

216

The Report, supra note 1, at 552-55.
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of raising them
salesmen down to the low level of insurance salesmen, instead
2 17
to the relatively higher standard of the securities salesman.
It should be emphasized that to remove the limitation on a sales
approach, in the case of a mutual fund salesman, while leaving the restriction
to curb securities salesmen generally, will prove to be unfair to the latter. It
should be noted that in terms of the nature of the product offered for sale,
the mutual fund is more akin to the share of stock, than to the life insurance
21 8
policy, which is generally viewed in the light of savings and protection.
In fact, the result of Report A's recommendation would be a particularly
unfair one, when viewed against the background of the fact that the securities
salesman is the one who has met the more rigorous requirements and standards. Yet, the less adequately trained mutual fund salesman is permitted to
roam through private homes in his quest for sales.
The Report also contends that such a prohibition is difficult to enforce,
and that many mutual fund salesmen ignore the prohibition and few are
reprimanded for it.219 Lax enforcement procedures, however, constitute a
poor rationale for repeal. The difficulty of enforcement should not be made
the touchstone of the legitimacy of a statutory standard. It would be preferable to assess the statute on its essential merit. Since The Report itself proposes a scheme for closer supervision of salesmen on the part of the staff
of the sales organization, this prohibition may be added to the staff's responsibilities.22 0 This comment is not predicated on any great faith in the willingness of the staff, under The Report's proposals, to successfully supervise, but
is only pointed out for the sake of suggesting the possibility of enforcement
within the set of assumptions made by The Report itself.
There is reason to believe that securities salesmen look upon the section
67(2) prohibition with more seriousness than do the mutual fund salesmen.
The difference lies in the fact that mutual fund salesmen, because of ease
of entry into the salesman's position and lack of long-term commitment to it,
may not be as concerned about infringing a statutory prohibition, and jeopardizing, what they may view as, at best, a tenuous kind of a 'career'. Stock
brokers, with the requirement that they be full-time employees, have a greater
measure of commitment. Because of this, and the more rigorous standards
they must comply with to gain entry into the industry, they have more to lose
in chancing a violation. This point would also lend credence to our contention
that part-time salesmen are a detriment to the object of fostering professionalism in the mutual fund salesman.
The benefits of retaining this prohibition by far outweigh any difficulties
it imposes on some. On the theory that a man's home is his castle, he deserves
to be protected from salesmen who are 'inspired' by., the generous level of
mutual fund commissions, to knock on his door or ring his telephone, and
217 Cf. generally, J. Gollin, Pay Now, Die Later (New York: Random House,
1966) for a discussion of the high-pressure sales techniques employed by life insurance

salesmen. Many of Gollin's criticisms are applicable to the mutual fund industry.
218 J. J. Brown, Life Insurance: Benefit, Or Fraud (Toronto: Longmans Canada
Limited, 1964) esp. Chapter 1, What Life Insurance Is at 2.
210 The Report, supra note 1, at 553.
220 Id. at 526-530.
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thereby invade his privacy. There is good reason, in the case of securities and
mutual funds, to protect a person, when he is in his dwelling house, where he
may be more easily persuaded to make an investment that is unwise for him.
He is less sales-resistant in the atmosphere of his home, where he may decide
not to resist the salesman, but to go along with him, so that, in the presence
of the members of his family, he may not appear to be outwitted by a salesman who has been trained to anticipate his objections to mutual funds, with
glib assurances. The mutual fund salesman can apply the same 'fear' and
'scare' tactics that life insurance salesmen have been known to employ with
For example, he may persuade a man to buy a
such deadly effectiveness.
'contractual plan', 221 by pointing to the children or portraits of the children
in the living room, and reminding the parent of his duty to provide for their
future, and build an estate in order that the children be cared for in any
eventuality. Mutual fund salesmen ought not be permitted to indiscriminately
enter peoples' homes and use the home setting to stage emotional appeals,
where rationality would dictate a course for the investor which is different
from that suggested by a commission-seeking salesman.
It should not be forgotten that the salesman, under sec. 67(2) of the
Securities Act, 1966, may approach certain categories of people in their
homes, and that sales literature, which includes a 'response-coupon' may be
circulated by mail to certain neighbourhoods the salesman would like to
'cover'. The responses would likely constitute the written requests for information that would allow the salesman the right under the statute to call at the
business or place of employment of the prospect. This is sensible, because,
in his office, a person tends to be more businesslike in his response, and might
be more inclined to make a rational decision when confronted with an investment proposal. It is conceded that many individuals will not have offices where
they may be visited. But, these would tend to be lower-income groups, those
who are less well-educated, who need the protection from the door-to-door
salesman more so than others.
The Report suggests 222 that perhaps this prohibition against calling on
people other than friends or relatives in their residences, is a reason for the
high turnover of mutual fund salesmen who sell to friends and relatives
successfully, because they may interview them in their homes, but since they
cannot sell to others in this manner, their sales careers are nipped in the
bud. However, the reason for the high turnover of salesmen, lies at the doorstep of the sales organizations who hire salesmen on the basis of considerations other than high standards and qualifications. It is believed that many
engage salesmen indiscriminately, with the intention, at the outset, that the
salesman will bring in essentially the business of his friends and relatives, and
not very much more. In the U.S., in the absence of the prohibition with
regard to calling on residences, the same problem of high turnover continues
to exist. The Special Study bears out this contention, when it indicates that
and relatives, and earning little more
many salesman, after selling to friends
223
than $20 a week, leave the business.
221 Cf. supra, p. 615 for discussion of
222The Report, supra note 1, at 553.
223

Supra, note 211, at 114.
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The Special Study mentions a manual advising sales organizations to
search for salesman who have experience in door-to-door selling, such 2as
24
those who have been selling cosmetics, storm windows, and food freezers.
Gopman, citing from The Special Study, asks the pertinent question "Should securities be sold in the same manner as Fuller Brushes?"' 225 Gopman
also indicates that The Special Study "concludes that NASD and the SEC
cannot hope to control high-pressure selling since the sales pitch usually takes
place orally in the home. ' 226 Why should we be willing, in Ontario, to lower
the standard, and add to the problem of high-pressure salesmanship, by
relaxing the sec. 67(2) prohibition, and inviting the door-to-door mutual fund
salesman?
It is interesting that The PorterReport endorses the 'calling at residences'
prohibition, together with its application to mutual fund salesmen. "We wish
to support the continued need for such legislation, 227 including that aimed at
mutual fund salesmen, to prevent the harassment of the public. 228

CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the recommendations of The Report, not only fail to
give relief in the case of exceedingly high sales charges and management fees,
but hold out the possibility that these will be increased in the future. The
Report not only fails to raise the standards of salesmanship, which it believes
currently to be of an edifying nature, but would even remove a positive restraint which now exists.
One may hypothesize that Report A represents the triumph of a successful lobbying effort on the part of the mutual fund industry, and Report B,
the articulate struggle of those who would want to offer recommendations
designed to effectively protect the public in an area where it is in dire need of
protection.
In evaluating The Report's recommendations, it is helpful to consult the
work produced by the SEC, such as The Wharton Study, The Special Study,
The Policy Study, as well as the submissions of the SEC, professors and economists recorded in the various Congressional Committee Reports. Thus, the
conclusions will be the result of an assessment of varying viewpoints, approaches and policies.
at 115.
Supra, note 204, at 413.
220 Id. at 414.
227 S. 67(2) of the Securities Act, 1966, but s. 53 of the Securities Act, as it was in

224 id.
225

1964.
228

Supra, note 5, at 353.
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The Report is indeed an impressive document, comprehensive in its grasp
of the nature of the mutual fund industry and its peculiar problems, and profound in its search for solutions. It is characterized by felicity of expression,
while, at the same time, careful and precise in its analysis. The Report is a
great achievement, reflecting careful research and meticulous scholarship. It
deserves nothing less than the most intensive study and consideration. Given
a reflective and carefully reasoned response to The Report, the result will be
a regulatory framework designed to encourage confidence in an honest and
competent mutual fund industry, and to provide the protection which the
public expects and well deserves.

